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 Cartographies of Copyright is a cultural history of copyright that maps out 
various contradictions and tensions that give shape to the crisis of copyright and its 
relations to US music industries. More specifically, this work charts the radical 
dissension of copyright in recent history and argues for an understanding of the crisis as 
an internal transformative process. This formulation shifts the analytic approach from an 
abstract conceptual-legal perspective to a series of discrete points within a lived history, 
culture and materiality of copyright thought, audio technologies and neoliberal 
capitalism. Seen in terms of territorialization, the expansion of copyright via the music 
industries gives unique insight into the particular ways music and its media formats 
effect the evolution of copyright culture and law. When framed this way, an 
investigation into music and copyright leads to recognizing new forms of control, 
changing modes of administering access and contemporary relations of power. 
 To chart the effects of these transformations I draw upon the tensions and 
problematics that constitute the Wu-Tang Clan’s 2015 one-of-a-kind release: Once Upon 
A Time In Shaolin. After accessing contentious foci within traditional copyright 
paradigms, I argue that classical models lack explanatory power, pose problems for 
understanding the transformations of copyright throughout history and fail to provide a 
comprehensive account of the present crisis. Taking inspiration from the reoccupation 
thesis presented by Hans Blumenberg and recent research in copyright I propose an 
alternative model rooted at the dialectic crux of property metaphors, audio technologies 
and formats, and neocapitalist commodity logic––all of which give shape to an internal 
transformation within copyright law and culture I term propertization. 
 Cartographies of Copyright is not a legal treatise, per se; rather, the work sees 
law as text set within a larger social milieu liable to change and evolution. Drawing 
from legal theory, cultural studies and media studies the work engages copyright from 
the perspectives of critical history, rhetoric, media-materiality and speculative 
economics. The multidisciplinary approach also stakes out new formations to the 
problematics faced by music historically and to draw connections between the music 
industries and the broader social contexts they are situated in.  
 Cartographies argues for a new lexicon to begin imagining alternative models to 
account for copyright’s transformations––ones better suited to imagining viable 
alternatives. It calls attention to the urgent need of public discussion concerning the role 
of copyright in contemporary music and culture and provides modest suggestions for 
thinking about the future of the copyright regime and the musical properties within it. 
Keywords: copyright, property, intellectual property, propertization, culture, rhetoric, 
metaphor, reoccupation, media, format, platform, technology, economics.  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“The crisis of artistic reproduction which manifests itself in this way  
can be seen as an integral part of a crisis in perception itself.” 
Walter Benjamin, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire” 
Scholars have long decried the expansion of copyright, and while most theoretical 
formulations demonstrate it to be the effects of a plurality of forces, these approaches 
belie a certain logical organization that forbids asking certain types of questions, namely  
just into what copyright is expanding? This question may at first glance seem absurd, 
but the logical consequences of seeking out possible answers requires engaging with a 
copyright far more implicated in society, industry and culture than dominant legal or 
conceptual frameworks prescribe. If copyright expansion is, as many scholars have 
argued, antithetical to its core goals and rational, new approaches to understanding the 
function of copyright and its expansion are needed. What follows aims to provide such 
an approach.  
Written as a speculative history, this work surveys and charts developments within 
copyright to map out dimensions of the expanding copyright regime. It is ‘speculative’ 
on a number of levels; in the first, it proceeds along a conjectural route with the 
intention of asking new questions of copyright, its conceptual formation, its pragmatic 
function in the music industries and its growing position in American culture and 
history more generally.  In the second, drawing from the unique one-of-a-kind album, 1
Once Upon A Time In Shaolin, this thesis plays on the etymological root, specere “to 
look at, view”, to consider what I will argue is the spectacle of copyright–––that is, 
certain schematic metaphors that give copyright its form, determine its power within 
contemporary culture and vectorize its effects on the social relationships that constitute 
it.  To map the extent of these relations and their historical transformations is, I argue, to 2
 Throughout the reminder of the thesis I will be referring to “copyright” in the United States of America 1
and am not, say, more generally equating copyright with authors’ rights in the European Union unless 
otherwise noted. The culture of copyright, while not a common denominator globally, is intimately 
involved in a steadily growing number of trade agreements with the U.S. and thus reflections in this 
essay, I hope, can seen in light of larger ramifications for a globalizing culture more broadly.
 While not being a commodity itself outright, copyright represents the framework and network for 2
understanding and facilitating the commodification of cultural products while simultaneously 
affecting our perception of cultural goods more generally.
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account not only for the ways copyright has transformed and the consequences of these 
developments but serves to see how copyright is transforming the musical landscape.  
Research Focus
Research directed at copyright has previously taken aim at accounting for how 
copyright has expanded with little attention spared for engaging with the question of 
“into what?” Given its historically factual origins and its common linguistic formation 
in spatial terms (extends, distends, expands, etc.), why does the spatial metaphor always 
run aground? This is all the more alarming when we consider it in chronological terms. 
All arguments for or against copyright’s expansion throughout history have involved 
inherited views of the past and a diverse array of models for imagining the future. Take 
for instance the music industries. Views of composers and their compositions 
transformed with the advent of the player piano and again with the LP. More recently 
remixing, mash-ups, P2P file-sharing networks and online streaming have all had 
profound impacts on imagining and reimagining the role and position of copyright for 
industry and individuals alike. Yet acknowledgement of a historical consciousness, both 
indebted and expectant, appears rarely, if at all. For many scholars it surfaces only when 
indicating how far astray we have come. Thus, questions of the sort “into what?”, aim to 
locate formulations of copyright within specific historical epochs wherein possible 
views of the future of copyright arise and can be conceptually circumscribed. For the 
purposes of this thesis it has a second function as well. “Into what?”, aims to draw 
attention to the spatial dimension of the copyright regime, to the set of relations that 
comprise the concrete social, material, and economic worlds wherein the copyright 
regime excesses its power. The expansion of copyright cannot be limited to conceptions 
of a stable or maturing copyright extending temporally––a mere question of duration––
but must account for the multiple public and private dimensions of experiences 
copyright affects. 
Accounting for multiple dimensions stands in contrast to the impression one might get 
from much discussion surrounding copyright. A standard history might suggest the 
fairly simple equation where a growing moral decay amongst an audience less and less 
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inclined to pay for musical works plus a declining difficulty of entry to access content 
equals the collapse of major cultural industries. These simplifications and abstractions 
famously supplant the real material and historical conditions rendering them easier to 
swallow, more practical for introducing change. Given this narrative structure, the 
response to the ‘onslaught’ of lazy thieves has been the steady attempt to secure more, 
longer and stronger protections for copyright right’s holders––a view the courts and 
congress seem to have sided with recently, and more frequently. This expansion 
nevertheless, comes at a cost.  To be sure, scholars writing against such expansion have 3
recently picked up on this logic and many have sought to re-frame the question in terms 
of a “trade-off” by concocting notions of “cultural environmentalism” that seek an 
ecological-social sustainability between the creative producers and their industrial-
intellectual environment. But even then, “sustainability” fails to offer a history of 
copyright accountable for the legal or cultural transformations up to the present, and 
much less a consensual logic to resolve the present crisis. 
But it is best to start from consensus. While scholars can disagree on virtually every 
aspect of copyright, I think it is fair to say that literature on copyright unanimously 
agrees that copyright has expanded since its initial constitutionalization; and, secondly, 
most Americans became aware of being domiciled to the copyright regime in the wake 
of the internet and digital downloading. Within roughly a decade of time, its reaches, 
excesses and powers were impressed into the public consciousness, and the conquest 
continues. But well into the twentieth-century copyright was understood as a limited 
term monopoly privilege guaranteed by the government for the promotion of knowledge 
to the benefit of the public. Many scholars have tended to see this transformation 
negatively yet they nonetheless part ways when defining where and how along the way 
it managed to be turned on its head and has continued to transcended its previous 
limitations without exception. It is precisely in charting out this network of relations, the 
coordinates and their referents within the copyright regime, that this thesis stakes out a 
new approach: a cartography of copyright. 
 The price we pay is not only in terms of “giving up ground” within the public domain, but we forfeit an 3
approach to understanding the structure of, and historical developments within, copyright.
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In drawing from cartographic studies, the hypothesis of this thesis stakes out a model of 
copyright that draws from traditional concepts, what on a map might be likened to large 
continuous areas and develops an map of the copyright regime by pinpointing a 
constellation of coordinates and access points. These points, in turn, define the 
territories formed within them and when considering digital technologies, connecting 
these points is easier than ever. In the realm of music, this means working though 
concepts of author, format and work towards an understanding of the power structures 
framing contemporary musical properties. This thesis also is indebted to hermeneutical 
studies and so places the task of understanding, “as a historical and experiential act in 
relation to entities which themselves possess historical force, as well as a point of 
departure in the experience of the work of art and the constitution of an aesthetics.”  It 4
asks how our understanding of copyright might be affected, even distorted, by previous 
formations of copyright held as “true” or “right” in the past? The same goes for how 
power might be exerted or expressed within historical and contemporaneous 
frameworks. Drawing from the work of Reinhart Koselleck and Hans Blumenberg I am 
less occupied by the philosophical questions the notion of historical consciousness 
brings to the fore, as by the historical question of what type of experience of 
understanding is made possible by it. That is, implicit in this work is the question of 
how can we account for our experiences of copyright in contemporaneity (informed by 
understandings of the age of modernity, post-modernity or even second modernity), and 
posit an understanding that acknowledges the breaks in history digitalization has incited 
without discounting the continuity of certain conditions that gave rise to them? 
How then to account for the continuity of law and the discontinuity of history? How to 
account for changes while acknowledging some level of consistency? These are 
questions the historian is familiar with. In charting out the expansion of copyright law 
and culture this thesis argues for an understanding rooted in a process termed 
“propertization”. My claim to see copyright’s expansion in terms of property is not 
unprecedented, but while this varied and nuanced research grounds my approach, these 
accounts are nonetheless, incomplete. In identifying “property talk” or “property logic” 
 Keith Tribe, translators introduction to Futures Past, by Reinhart Koselleck, (New York: Columba 4
University Press, 2004),  xvi.
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as the main factor for copyright’s expansion thinkers approach property as they 
approach authors, works, audiences and even rights––conceptually. Such conceptual 
thinking fails to account for the historical pragmatism required by language and in so 
doing disregards the structural accounts of a world that follow in transformations within 
property. When we think about property as a concept, we fail to account on the full 
spectrum of rhetorical and theoretical underpinnings that come with references to 
property. Instead, I argue for thinking of property in terms of a metaphorical propensity 
for structuring a world in its image. Furthermore, the constellation of concepts that 
comprise the discourse of property relations––its foregrounded rhetorics––such as 
ownership, values, inheritance, etc., grant novel insights when anchored by a 
background metaphorics of property. Both of these prior reasons lead to a third: with 
contemporary mass media, globalization and digitalization new ways of thinking about 
the new spaces to extract rent, to control access and exercise power are needed that 
traditional property models are not able to reach. But perhaps most importantly, 
focusing on propertization makes clear that critiques of copyright must be 
contextualized within the bounds of material culture and the possibilities of creativity 
within historical societies. 
Thus, while the standard narrative of copyright’s response to internet exposure seems to 
corroborate with most peoples’ experiences the copyright regime is by no means 
inherently digital. In fact, the allusion to an intangible origin creates an easily scalable 
problem for right’s holders that ultimately puts the public, or those against the 
unnecessarily and excessive advances of copyright law, at a radical disadvantage. But 
there is a contradiction here. The standard narrative attempts to extort the plurality of 
concerns the internet and digitalization references (global scale theft, technological 
disruption, anonymity, flooded markets, etc.,) all the while assuming some familiarity 
with a pre-digital process. This thesis begins by asking why did copyright reach a state 
of crisis now, and not at some other time? And furthermore, what could a crisis of 
copyright even mean for us? Phrased historically, under what conditions could a crisis 
of copyright be possible and comprehensible as such? 
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Approaches to Crises
These conditions, the hypothesis of the thesis holds, allow us to chart the dimensions of 
the crisis and grant a more comprehensive understanding of copyright today. Scholars 
have written extensively on a crisis-ridden modernity and indeed, many continue to 
argue that the crisis of copyright can and should be understood by framing it as one 
amongst many.  Indeed, this position seems generally accepted on an institutional level.  5 6
The idea that copyright is somehow a latecomer to crisis, that it had progressed 
flawlessly until it met its digital demise, is simply untenable however. While the idea 
that copyright has faced multiple crises and suffered them admirably, only to come out 
stronger on the other side is equally untenable for right’s holders of today. The 
remarkable tendency within copyright rhetoric to speak of an encroaching future points 
to the specific kind attention given to the present. A present now plagued, of course, but 
never contextualized as previous future. If the failure to historicize copyright is 
increasing, it is no doubt the weight of a future our society pushes upon us in shorter 
and more similar intervals complicating our capacity to assess ourselves and our 
environments in order to adapt accordingly. With the profusion of charts, ratings and 
stats the fetish for the new hit is undeniably strong in the music industry. But it is 
nothing particularly new. Why is it felt so strongly now?  
With the rise of post-modernism, post-humanism and other such schools of thought on 
the left, arguments for a need to account for these seemingly radically different set of 
conditions arise: the present is often described as some gross set of aftereffects from 
inexhaustible forces begun somewhere in modernity but which have catapulted us into 
an uncertain present. Not only have considerations of older, longer-standing conditions 
 The terminological choice of “crisis” reflects a historical and theoretical indebtedness to hermeneutical 5
practice and continues in the trajectory of previous scholars of copyright. Although, considering 
copyright in reference to a “risk-society,” such as described by Ulrich Beck, would no doubt provide 
rich interpretations for further scholarship on copyright culture and law.
 “Although this body of legal rules certainly has a rich prehistory, the institutions and mechanisms that 6
regulated information production before 1710 (patronage, printing press, and so forth) were rooted in 
understandings of social life that assumed the primacy and stability of hierarchical authors and 
(accordingly) did not reflect the emergence of “possessive individualism” and, with it, 
modernity,” (Biagioli, Jaszi and Woodmansee 2011, 414).
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whose pressure is no longer felt as pressing been abandoned, but they should be 
declaimed as myths in their own right.  
These presentations are caricatures in ways, each is far more complex and both have 
provided lasting contributions to scholarship but the victories and pitfalls each system 
solicits produces real problems for developing a comprehensive investigation into 
copyright. On the one hand, modernist crises often fail to account for the many ways 
politics (identity, gender, race, etc.,) and economics have empowered an increasingly 
small number of investors and hedge-fund managers while the growing mass of society 
have become entrepreneurial individuals. Much less can it explain why the musical 
industries embody finance capital institutions where traditional models of exchange and 
incentive fail to accounts for the reality or creative producers. This tendency is 
mimicked within the music industries with three “majors” dominated nearly eighty 
percent of music revenues and then the top one percent of artists taking the lion’s share 
of those profits. That being said, neither can a post-modern declaration of the death of 
totalizing systems, subjectivity and the author account or provide insight into 
responding to the rise of a singular monolith in a global neoliberalism, and the radical 
distribution of knowledge and information to the economic vast financial benefit of a 
few. A concept of crisis, if it is to bear the weight of accounting for the present situation, 
must be bound up in the social and political actions of human-beings and their 
institutions and organizations. 
In framing investigations, Raymond Williams and David Harvey, have observed the 
need to ground theory with a “militant particularism.” All interpretations drawn from 
discrete factors of lived limitations and expectations tirelessly transcend their unique 
circumstances. Harvey writes: 
“The move from tangible solidarities understood as patterns of social life organized in 
affected and knowable communities to a more abstract set of conceptions that would 
have universal purchase involves a move from one level of abstraction – attached to 
place – to another level of abstraction capable of reaching out across space. And in that 
move, something [is] bound to be lost.”  7
 David Harvey, Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers Inc. 7
1996), 33.
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The dialectical process of reflecting upon discrete collections of actions, behaviors and 
communities tirelessly runs into the impositions of abstraction––time and space. In 
mapping out various dimensions of copyright and the changes they undergo through 
time, an aggregate form takes shape. This shape represents the lay of the land and 
depicts the growing sphere of influence for copyright. Grounding the expansion of 
copyright in spatial terms is all the more pressing when we considerer that we are 
situated at the crux of the contemporary capitalist declaration: “the annihilation of space 
through time.” Here, in this contradiction, studies of copyright can dig in, measure the 
distances and chart the means of expansion.  
In the music industries specifically, the crisis is said to be linked to the devaluation of 
music. The easy elision between value and worth should be noted here, but I insist we 
suspend cynical judgement and address this concern in full expectation that there is 
more to be learned from the situation, even if its description is less helpful. With the 
recent release and exclusive sale of the most expensive album in the world, Once Upon 
a Time in Shaolin by the Wu-Tang Clan, the singular one-of-a-kind album went for two 
million dollars and put the question of the value of music front and center; and did it all 
without a single mention of copyright.  To be sure, in the fine print the “new and unique 8
legal structures” created to mount and realize the sale were mentioned and an alarming 
awareness of contemporary copyright rhetoric was implicated in publicity surrounding 
the album. The issue of copyright explicitly, was not, however, mentioned. It is not 
surprising at first glance, law tends to take a backseat in discussions of artistic genius in 
most conversations. That the law served to make possible the work’s effort to, among 
other things, “reverse the devaluation of music” within a changing cultural landscape is 
somehow easy enough to swallow, but the idea that this kind of model would actually be 
implemented seems absurd.  All in all, Once Upon A Time in Shaolin points to the 9
growing presence of copyright, a condition that not only captures the real movements 
within copyright law and culture, but speaks to the difficulty of forming an opinion 
about it. It is somehow, obvious, trite, passé, unquestionable. It forms the basis for  
 Press Release, see Appendix.8
 Press Release, see Appendix.9
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allocating views on authorship, art work, audience and capital and determines the space 
of conversation. Hence the need for a topological approach to copyright. Copyright has, 
as it were, already prepared the space. There is something alarming about the silence it 
produces. Once Upon A Time In Shaolin can be said to be the occasion to begin talking. 
Perhaps it is because the preposterous model it proposes reflects and distorts tendencies 
already in motion within the present model for music productions and distribution. It 
posits, as it were, a ghostly image of the future cobbled together from bits of the past 
and bytes of the present. 
Sounds of Copyright
These broad changes point to the moving geography of influence of music. Music has 
left the minstrels and parlors and has graduated into the halls of global corporate 
business. There is something more fundamental here also, a question that hinges on 
experience and the possibility of creativity that we would do well to consider. 
“Innovation” aside, what are the kinds of relationships we have with art, music and our 
common culture? What are the kinds we want to have? What is the difference between 
the privatization of our word and the privatization of our ability to imagine another one? 
These questions hinge on the belief that copyright, and intellectual property more 
broadly, is not simply about the things, works, objects, expressions that we protect or 
copy, but, rather, about the relationships people have via those things with each other. 
Given that copyright has expanded beyond its own image into an invasively large 
aspects of our daily lives, more often then not criminalizing all who come into contact 
with it, how might this affect our views of copyright’s role in creativity? 
If the album points to an ambivalence surrounding copyright, it should not be taken as 
any kind of resignation to business as usual. From their debut record with Loud/RCA 
records, the Wu-Tang Clan saw hip-hop as a business. De facto leader of the Wu-Tang 
Clan, the RZA, boasted: 
“We reinvented the way hip hop was structured, and what I mean is, you have a group 
signed to a label, yet the infrastructure of our deal was like anyone else's [...] We still 
could negotiate with any label we wanted, like Meth went with Def Jam, Rae stayed 
with Loud, Ghost went with Sony, GZA went with Geffen Records, feel me? [...] And 
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all these labels still put ‘Razor Sharp Records’ on the credits [...] Wu Tang was a 
financial movement. So what do you wanna diversify...? [...] Your assets?”  10
This “free-agent” deal was unheard of before the RZA managed to put it into play. But 
that was just the beginning. The Wu-Tang Clan soon expanded into films (acting and 
composing), into merchandizing and ultimately into the Wu-Tang brand. While the Wu-
Tang certainly have had some innovative approaches to operating in the music industry, 
the radical nature of their one-of-a-kind album appears to have had some precedent. In 
the first article announcing the existence of the album, Forbes writer Zach Greenburg 
noted, "After watching Jay Z debut his album in partnership with Samsung last 
summer--and buy 100 copies of Nipsey Hussle's $100 mixtape--Cilvaringz and his Wu-
Tang compatriots had something resembling proof of concept for Once Upon A Time In 
Shaolin.”  The logic Greenburg employees sees differentiation and scarcity as the 11
revolutionary aspects to the album and completely neglects to mention the complex 
backstory of history, politics, law, art and culture that anchors the very idea of creativity. 
The emphasis on seeing the “new” within a financial logic speaks to the tendency to 
skip over copyright’s historical baggage in favor of its present (much higher) stake in 
economics. Once Upon A Time In Shaolin serves embodies the forces that cut across a 
musical property and determine it. 
Copyright has exceeded its boundaries as a mode of accounting for culture and become 
the dominant mode of recounting our culture.  There is perhaps nowhere more delicate 12
and divisive than the relationship between music and copyright. It is particularly 
vexed––not least because of the music industries utter dependence on copyright to 
generate profit. But music and the media that enable its production, dissemination and 
reception have historically challenged the limits of copyright law; and perhaps most 
interestingly, music, unique among the other arts has a special position in 
 RZA–interview 17 May 2005 “Wu-Tang Clan on the Rise”, 2005. wuforever Daily dose of Wu-Tang 10
News, accessed November 5, 2016, http://wuforever.com/index.php?limitstart=485.
 Zach Greenburg, “Why Wu-Tang Will Release Just One Copy of Its Secret Album,” Forbes, 26 March 11
2016, accessed October 23, 2016,  http://www.forbes.com/sites/zackomalleygreenburg/2014/03/26/
why-wu-tang-will-release-just-one-copy-of-its-secret-album/#5ff85c8e52fe
 Both in the sense of justifying the story of culture, art and science and in representing it numerically, 12
symbolically and ultimately economically.
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conceptualizing property relations and relations of production. Drawing from the work 
of French philosopher and economist, Jacques Attali, I contend that the dominant view 
that musical works of art “have in one way or another been taken as reflecting or 
corresponding to the economic, or at best as lagging behind concrete social 
development,” fails to account for the unique position music has in conceptualizing the 
creation and afterlives of creative works.  Given the historical fact of copyright’s 13
extension, and arguably most powerfully via the channels carved out by music and its 
affiliate industries, it stands to reason that music has some capacity to anticipate 
historical and social changes. I argue that the means and measures by which music has 
brought people into contact, to some degree, helped create the dominance of copyright 
that is at one and the same time, the very means for social transformation. Within the 
network of power lies the means to “search out the future in the present itself,” as 
Fredric Jameson argues, “and to see the current situation not merely as a bundle of static 
and agonizing contradictions, but also as the place of emergence of new realities of 
which we are as yet only dimly aware.” Thus, theorizing through copyright takes 
precedent over any theory of copyright. Once Upon a Time in Shaolin works to ground 
this theory as the embodied effects of copyright’s transformation and the occasion for 
imagining alternatives. 
The Rise of Copyright Talk
If Once Upon A Time In Shaolin does not ‘fix our problem’, it certainly makes it clear 
that alternative models are hard to come by. What’s more is that the apparent inability to 
talk about copyright is not because people are not taking about it. Consider for the 
moment this table below which diagrams the number of times the word “copyright” 
appears in the English language over the past century and a half. The term had steadily 
grown in popularity in line with the increase in protectable items until roughly the 
Copyright Act of 1976. By the turn of the century it had become a household term. This 
is telling, we can no longer excuse ourselves with the casual, “Who besides a few record  
 Jacques Attali, forward to Noise: The Political Economy of Music (Minneapolis: University of 13
Minnesota Press,1988), xi.
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company lawyers, cares?”  Copyright is not just for the few, it concerns everyone. The 14
ubiquity of copyright should not however, be mistaken for a general sense of clarity.   15
How is this possible? The traditional response is that copyright is, of course, a highly 
complex piece of legislation wrapped in a strain of legalese whose existence has, for 
most of our history, been relegated to courtrooms and boardrooms. And this argument 
has some validity to this day. But while preeminent scholars of copyright continue to be 
lawyers copyright has become the concern of a diverse number of fields and 
disciplines.  Scholars have argued that the rhetorics have something to do with this 16
sudden increase, often pointing to a full on legal crusade against pirates.  
Just take a look at the number of lawsuits flooding the courts in the wake of the RIAA’s 
legal campaign against their own customers. An estimated 30,000 individuals receiving 
  Simon Frith and Lee Marshall, Music and Copyright (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004), 14
1. 
 This ubiquity of the term “copyright” and “intellectual property”, along with “information society” and 15
“knowledge economy” have indeed become household terms. Scholars have noted on the 
international desire, led by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) to get the ideas into 
the classroom, and soon: “To that end, WIPO has recently published a colorful comic book (featuring 
games like “Spot the Infringement”) to instill respect for copyright in children’s minds––a concept 
that might already be lost on their older, file-sharing siblings,” (Biagioli, Jaszi, and Woodmansee 
2011, 1).
The field is steadily growing. Biagoli, Jaszi, and Woodmansee write at the beginning of Making and 16
Unmaking Intellectual Property: “One an area of the law populated only by a technical subculture of 
attorneys and scholars, intellectual property (IP) has become a focus of vital concern and remarkably 
intense inquiry across an expanding range of disciplines and consistencies,” (Biagoli, Jaszi, and 
Woodmansee 2011, 1).
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Google Ngram Chart: Copyright
Frequency of the term “copyright” in English language texts 
a threat of legal action, at the peak, only recently has their number has begun to lessen.  17
Lawsuits in 2009, some 2,192 are down almost a third from 2008, and “represent more 
than a 50 percent drop from 2005.”  These lawsuits are often accompanying with “pre-18
litigation” settlement letters geared towards the easy profit extraction without any need 
to enter the courtroom. Many of the court letters are simply John Doe letters tied to an 
IP address procured by subpoena to an internet provider. But another response to the 
aforementioned excuse for copyright’s mystery might be, “yeah, it has been behind 
locked doors, but not without a good reason,” and while there are compelling reasons to 
this argument too, it frames copyright in a vein of risk management thinking, one geared 
towards securing the continued viability of the status quo. 
Considering copyright historically, we must first notice that copyright rarely, if ever, 
becomes an issue except in the event of its infringement. Put another way, copyright 
only comes up when its a problem. If you look at the headlines over the last decade 
copyright is flanked by a host of terms of derision: “violation”, “theft”, “plagiarism”, 
“lawsuit”, “risk”, “fight”, “battle”. The negative terminology surrounding copyright is a 
moral argument in action. One whose teleological grasp we’re unable or unwilling to 
hazard arguing against. While the following graph does not describe any actual increase 
 See the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s review “RIAA v. The People: Five Years Later”. See also: 17
David Kravets, "File Sharing Lawsuits at a Crossroads, After 5 years of RIAA Litigation," Wired 
Magazine Sept. 8, 2008.
 David Kravets , “Copyrights Lawsuits Plummet in Aftermath of RIAA Campaign,” Wired Magazine, 18
August 5 2010, accessed November 5, 2016, https://www.wired.com/2010/05/riaa-bump/
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in criminality or copyrightness in society but it does show corresponding growth across 
both amongst English-language books. 
There is a second point I want to make about this. The previous graph does not specify 
legal text books or techie texts but is simply books, across the board. A simple cross 
referencing with the top hits on Google reveals just about anyone and anything under 
suspicion. From Justin Bieber, Facebook or Monsanto, to the “Happy Birthday Song”, 
“Stairway to Heaven” or even major Pharmaceutical companies to Google Books are 
either in court, settling outside it or paying up because of it.  The range is stunning. 19
From the banal to the iconic, from food to drugs, from oral tradition to digital 
corporation, all are equally at risk. The range of texts that would need to account for this 
increase in use is growing and so is this ‘world of copyright’. It is also much bigger, 
more complex and, I argue, more intimately imbricated in American culture in ways that 
have hitherto been under-appreciated, if not unacknowledged.  
To understand these changes requires leaving the the legal nodal point of copyright out 
into its cultural and medial embodiments. Copyright, while rooted in the legal sphere, is 
not restricted to it, and nor should any investigation. In part, because there remains a 
particular stronghold within intellectual property. Peter Jaszi writes, “Many would 
accept that notions of crime are rooted in religious and ethical beliefs or that the 
emergence of human rights law was abetted by the ethos of post–World War II 
decolonialization. But among intellectual property scholars, there has been some 
resistance to claims of cultural influence in the copyright field––at least in the United 
  Google search was compiled on April 26, 2016.19
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States.”  Despite scholarship on the cultural products of the author or the artistic work, 20
scholars refuse to acknowledge any alternative underlying premises. Jaszi’s diagnosis is 
a collective “disillusioned position that copyright, unlike other bodies of law, is really 
all about the money; that IP law is simply a machine to generate innovation thorough 
economic incentives; and that lawyers are merely engineers called on occasionally to 
tweak or tinker with the mechanism.”   21
Jaszi is quoted at length here because where the rhetoric used to describe the problem 
ends is where this thesis begins. We must venture forth from the legal shade because the 
model of power, copyright as legal authority presupposes, has become outdated. The 
regime of copyright has no center.  Rather than declare the death of the author, the 22
collapse of law, or the end of the State, I refer to the nature of the network, perhaps 
evidenced nowhere more profoundly than within contemporary economic theory. Such 
logic may be reprehensible when considering the motivation or intention of copyright, 
but is not irrational when analyzing its development. If the idea that copyright is limited 
to financial concerns is held by disillusioned lawyers, it is because we have a corrupt 
view of contemporary capitalism and its role in technological development. To say 
copyright is only about the money may in some sense appear to be contradictory in light 
of the growing relevance of cultural studies into law and the failing economics of many 
copyright dependent industries but correlations between the successes and failures of 
industry and capital are fiction and bare no relation to reality insomuch as to market 
fluctuation. The strength of copyright does not guarantee the strength of ones stocks. A 
critical approach to the changing material conditions and growing logic of finance-
capital in copyright dependent industries provides compelling grounds for 
understanding transformations within the copyright regime. Transfigurations that have 
turned copyright into an empire of transactions, of access and of excess. As discussions 
of copyright continue to be sequestered within legal and economic quarters we must 
 Biagioli, Jaszi, and Woodmansee, Making and Unmaking Intellectual Property (Chicago: University of 20
Chicago Press, 2011), 415.
  Biagioli, Jaszi, and Woodmansee, Making and Unmaking Intellectual Property, 416.21
 “Power, a while back, occupied the center. For it to come from this center, for it to be effective to its 22
edges, for it to be carried to the periphery, a necessary condition is that there be no obstacle and that 
the space be homogenous around its action,” (Serres 2007, 95).
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wrestle them out into the light of public opinion. For the questions copyright instigates 
have established themselves as political questions of the first order and so deserve 
consideration as such. 
The chapters that follow are divided in to these concerns. The first chapter, 
“Cartography of a Crisis” opens up the discussion of crisis by exploring the historical 
conditions underpinning a crisis in copyright. In ‘framing’ the discussion of copyright in 
terms of its crisis I reference previous literature and analyze the received knowledge. I 
then propose a model for mapping the various dimensions of the copyright regime and 
draw upon a logic of spatial thinking to identify relations of power. In the second 
chapter, “Background Metaphorics and Foreground Rhetoric,” I draw from the work of 
Hans Blumenberg, to provide a sustained critique of the background metaphorics of 
copyright. In charting the various positions copyright has occupied within American 
culture I propose a framework for understanding the transformations within copyright I 
call propertization. In the third chapter, “Re-formatting Copyright” I chart out the 
technological and materiality conditions of copyright within traditional formulations of 
copyright and argue that their are inherent contradictions, many of which are left 
unanswered or are resolved within a framework of contemporary capitalism. In the 
fourth chapter I plot the expansion of copyright along its corporate capitalist axes to 
draw out the underlying expectations of value and access. Each chapter aims at 
understanding copyright in the framework of different totalities or structures, none of 
which are exhaustive, but all of which reveal the dynamic development of copyright in 
relation to the music industries. 
While there is no single master narrative to account for the variety of topics, issues, 
positions and participants that arise from concerns of copyright, there is a urgent need to 
develop a consensus to begin imagining a common future. And to begin thinking about 
where copyright is headed, we need some account of how we arrived here. Copyright 
will and must transform, but it must also bend in the direction of securing free-speech, 
creativity and technological development. If the chapters of this thesis can make 
headway towards explaining this process and reorienting our approach then it will have 
!16
made a great impact in the politics of our culture already. I do not consider this work to 
be limited to mere criticism but see it as a positive contribution to the study of culture 
and history and as the basis for future work in the fields of music and copyright and 
their relations to the human person. Such a comprehensive approach, general as it is, 
provides the grounds for more enduring research and understanding. 
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I. Cartography of a Crisis
What the term “copyright” means, should, it seems, be readily discernible. Given that it 
is often presented as either self-evident or inherently flawed, most are familiar with the 
notion of describing the relationship between an author and a work such that a limited 
exclusive right belonging to the author for the use and distribution of a work is 
guaranteed by the state. What might be unfamiliar is the notion that this guarantee was 
implemented for the benefit of the public.  One need not reference statistics, data 23
analyses or algorithms from any of the dominant institutions or industries (which 
appearing non-rivalrous when not absorbing each other under their corporate umbrella), 
to see that the sentiment surrounding copyright is largely absent of public opinion.  24
Instead, copyright logic is administered by dominant industry stakeholders out of 
concern for authors and the sanctity works. The language however, proves dubious upon 
peering under the veil of corporate grandiloquence. Indeed, what once was a turn of 
phrase administered to install a constitutional defense against wrongful monopoly––no 
matter how “morally hazardous", “philistine” or “commercial”  it appears to the 
European observer––now refers to the basis for the industry standard white-knuckled 
grip on its content, US hardball legislation in the global market and the privatization of 
knowledge and information in what is referred to as the ‘second enclosure movement’ 
of the public domain.  25
The transformation of copyright I’m outlining here can, to a large extent, be situated in 
the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, despite being characterized as the result of a 
 See Lewis Hyde’s Common As Air: Revolutions, Art and Ownership for an incredibly well-written and 23
thoroughly investigated history of the public domain and a brilliant history of the guiding values behind 
the US Founding Fathers in terms of self-governance, creative communities and a conception of a public 
political being.
 Statistics, nevertheless, dot the horizon of any discussion concerning copyright, and often present 24
themselves with the numerical simplicity and self-evident explanatory power only numbers can. As the 
majority of the numbers come directly from the record industries themselves the subsequent statistics 
have certain limitations (see Dave Laing’s work in Popular Music 16/3 pp. 311-12 & Popular Music 17/3 
328-29).
 For a more thorough exploration of the many enclaves within reach of the copyright regime see James 25
Boyle’s “The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain” (Law and 
Contemporary Problems: 2003), Lewis Hyde’s Common As Air: Revolutions, Art and Ownership, Yochai 
Benkler’s The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom.
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sudden cultural unmooring in the information storm digitalization has produced. For a 
frame of reference, we might look to the millennium mania, what was dubbed by John 
Hamre, United States Deputy Secretary of Defense, as the “electronic equivalent of El 
Niño.” While historical synchronicity guarantees nothing, the reference point serves to 
identify a wildfire-like craze that appeared to put entire industries, banking systems and 
all the way up to the edifice of western civilization, at risk. The “millennium bug” was a 
contagion of geopolitical and world banking concern now remembered mainly as 
popular culture mania and generic computing compression.  It is not my intention to 26
make light of the situation or the claims made by either side; rather, I aim to raise the 
question about what kind of public dimension can be said to inform the conditions 
underlying a crisis of copyright. It was, after all, in the mist of Y2k that we saw Napster 
burst out of the Dot.com bubble and convert any remaining agnostics or non-believers 
that the issue of copyright was anything but a non-issue. Both its historical moment and 
the means by which it reached its newly founded relevance in the public consciousness 
might account for a particular coloring of the crisis. More importantly, this extensive 
public dimension, as the Y2K moment reminds us, is more than “mass media” hysteria 
but points to how both the intricate and grand aspects of technology affect what and 
how we think about the structures that govern and guide our daily lives. In this chapter I 
aim to map out several key elements comprising the crisis of copyright, with particular 
emphasis on their musical contexts. 
Combatting the Static Narrative
To a great extent any connection between copyright’s charged arrival into the market of 
ideas and the radical inversion copyright, from public interest to the increased security 
and power of right’s holders, are fertile grounds for looking at the conditions of crisis. 
But an inversion of such scope would undoubtedly be unpalatable, if not improbable, 
had it happened over night; and even more dubious if we didn’t understand ourselves to 
still be in the midst of the very transformation we claim to have endured. Despite a 
 Hindsight is 20-20. Now it seems reasonable to force that disk space on computers was small and while 26
six digit dates, such as MMDDYY, were used instead of four-digit dates, like 1999, the roll-over problem 
of a computer not registering 00, as year 2000, instead of 1900, could have happened at the end of any 
century.
!19
tendency to adhere to a narrative of crisis that positions the critical point in 
contemporaneity, I argue that a comprehensive understanding of the situation is only 
recognizable over time and with recourse to the various positions copyright has 
occupied in the past. We would not be able to accept this critical predicament if we were 
unable to comprehend what had predated it: perhaps not every backroom compromise or 
public argument that went into its unique phrasing, but more importantly, why we feel 
so strongly about the faith, good will and explicit means Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of 
the United States Constitution entrusted to the United States Congress: 
 “To Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
 Times to Authors and Investors the exclusive Right their respective Writings and 
 Discoveries.”  27
There is no question that various interpretations of the constitution have, at times, been 
more convincing or less persuasive throughout history, and the copyright clause is no 
different.  I want to emphasize that what is most startling when considering the 28
apparent newness of the crisis of copyright is less the fact that there have been many 
crises before, most of which can be (are often are) quickly and compellingly framed as 
either issues of technological advancement or economic disaster, but our modern 
reluctance to reflect upon the history of copyright. This history is more than tradition, it 
is our mortgage. Modern thought has all too often sought out proof of its legitimacy by 
pointing out that the crises we moderns find ourselves in date back to some problematic 
origin that we have advanced from that we no longer face, to some past debts we no 
longer owe. It would follow that at some point in history a break, transition or mutation 
occurred that has tainted the well ever since. This belief in some original error in our 
modern concepts drove many mid-century thinkers to find the faults, both errors and 
breaks, in in our inheritance.  
 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.27
 History confirms interpretations have varied as hearts and minds have been won and lost, but it is 28
another question all together to ask if such mutability is the nature of law: “A law does not exist in 
order to be understood here historically, but to be concretized in its legal validity by being 
interpreted…This implies that the text, whether law or gospel, if it is it to be understood properly––
i.e., according to the claim it makes––must be understood at every moment, in every concrete 
situation, in a new a different way. Understanding here is always application,” (Gadamer 2004, 
308-309).
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A similar tendency prevails in copyright disputes. Critiques of the concept of the 
“romantic author” dominate much of copyright literature, while expositions on 
“symbiotic relationship between copyright law and technology” seek to ground 
copyright in a stable legal authority subjected to the whims of new business practices.  29
To be sure, more recent scholarship has dealt increasingly with the conceptual 
difficulties posed by fundamental legal differences (tangible and intangible property, 
idea/expression dichotomy, authorship, originality, etc.,) and these debates have 
extended beyond the traditional realms of policy but the narrative of crisis remains 
rooted in some (recent) past failure––be it moral, economic, legal or technological. If 
we actually take a historical view of the law, what past would we point to when 
suggesting that copyright broke down? After all, going back in time to some golden era 
would only result in fewer exclusive rights, shorter durations of protection and 
cumbersome application procedures until only books, maps and charts were covered, 
and even those would be published by royal decree. To chart the crisis of copyright 
requires a historical calculus capable of explaining the historical arc copyright has 
travelled and the processes working within it––not the mere difference between two 
points. 
For one, the legal armature of copyright requires that it is an aggregate of opinions 
about how to frame issues. Rights, after all, structure the form of government, the 
content of laws just as they shape and reveal the morality of lawmakers and law-abiders/
breakers. Such a view of copyright discloses, not an array of questions, but an ever 
shifting assortment of answers understood within a future horizon. Crisis is after all, 
always judged in relation to something not in crisis, replete with an expectation for 
some future. When thinking about modern crises, German philosopher and historian, 
Hans Blumenberg, observes a common historical fallacy: “something was absent, which 
is supposed to have been present before.”  This reasoning hardly explains the loss 30
 Ben Depoorter, “Technology and Uncertainty: The Shaping Effect on Copyright Law”, University of 29
Pennsylvania Law Review, 157/6, Symposium: The Foundations of Intellectual Property Reform (Jun., 
2009), 1832.
 Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, trans. Robert M. Wallace Boston: The MIT 30
Press, 1983), 4.
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though; it simply elaborates a means of accounting for a newer kind of change within an 
older paradigm––and in music, this tactic has cheated death out of a considerable 
fortune before.   31
Instead, I argue that any effort to understand the crisis of copyright turns not on a return 
to its origin, but by grasping how far we have come from it. As such, the approach 
pursues a historical account of the changing “positions” copyright has taken up by 
developing a sense of the reaches of the copyright regime and the subterranean 
continuity evidenced in the immanent politics it engenders.  To sketch out a 32
cartography of copyright then amounts to charting the distances and to mapping the 
extensions. An effort that amounts to identifying the relations and nodes of power 
within the world of copyright, how they change. To reframe the question from the origin 
of crisis to developing an understanding of the conditions of its being considered crisis 
is the driving motivation for this work.  
“Nothing wants to go back to the beginning,” Blumenberg writes in his major work The 
Legitimacy of the Modern Age.  “On the contrary, everything apportions itself 33
according to its distance from that beginning.”  Blumenberg’s thought is important for 34
remembering that the traditional narrative of crisis assumes a radical break with our 
emergence into the digital age. This epochal shift however, fails to account for any 
continuity within copyright. I propose it is a continuity predicated on problems rather 
than solutions. As Robert Wallace has noted, “instead of remaining forever fixated on 
‘doctrines’ or ‘ideas’ as the stuff of our tradition, we need to learn to relate these to the 
human activity of inquiring, of questioning, which gives them their relevance and 
 To see a more detail history of the music industries well documented fear of change, and particularly 31
technology, see Steve Knopper’s Appetite for Self-Destruction; Lawrence Lessig’s Free Culture;Alex 
Sayf Cummings’ Democracy of Sound.
 “Position” in relation to copyright refers to a dominant account of social relations that structure the 32
relationships that both represent and underlie authors, works and audiences within historical societies.
 Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, 4.33
 Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, 4. 34
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concrete meaning.”  We would do well to remember copyright’s importance to the 35
human activity of creativity and inquiry. They involve the challenge of deciding how to 
establish relations in society between author, work and audience that balances the need 
to ensure authors are adequately remunerated with the democratic pursuit of an 
enlightened public.  In doing so, we do so we may find other kinds of continuity 36
besides a nebulous expansion, technological intervention or a morally degenerate 
generation. For the remainder of this chapter I will draw out the lines of inquiry to give 
shape to the network of forces that constitute the conditions of a crisis of copyright to 
demonstrate that to the view the crisis of copyright as a matter of scope, rather than of 
size, offers novel interpretations of copyright, its role in society and the changes both 
have undergone.  37
Disentangling the Crisis
To begin thinking critically about copyright we need to distinguish it from other forms 
of intellectual property. Primarily, copyright is the expression of an idea and not the idea 
itself. This distinction is known as the idea/expression dichotomy. It is equally well 
appreciated how difficult it is to draw the line and how fundamental the establishment 
of such a line is. A shorthand here might suggest that copyright generally handles the 
conceptually complex topics of creativity, authorship and culture in ways that patents 
(concerned more with strict standard of “innovation” in the form of inventions, things 
and processes), and trademarks (intended to guarantee the “good will” of a company in 
the marketplace) do not. These seemingly flimsy distinctions derive from a notion of 
culture relatively foreign to contemporary ears. The one in which copyright came about 
was one where many creations were intuitively understood as common.  This word 38
 Blumenberg, translator’s introduction to The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, xviii.35
 There is no doubt that in the past, in the fervor of democracy, the driving motivation of copyright was 36
an informed and enlightened public engaged in the open and free exchange of ideas. Now such 
thoughts seem more to be afterthoughts.
 Raymond Shih Ray Ku, “The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and New Economics of 37
Digital Technology” The University of Chicago Law Review 69/1 (2002): 264.
 Lewis Hyde, Common As Air: Revolution, Art, and Ownership. This reading is predicated on a 38
historical understanding of the driving motivations of 18th century political thought and thinking through 
the vastly different intellectual milieu, such as the kind that produced the Republic of Letters and the 
French and American revolutions.
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“common”, in all of its various meanings, is extremely important for thinking about 
copyright for a number of reasons. While patents and trademarks most certainly effect 
the lived experience of individuals on a daily basis, often in more practical ways than 
copyright, they are rarely our “common concern.” In part, because they do not carry the 
cultural baggage copyright assumes (for better or for worse) nor have they emerged on 
the public scene with the same publicity and force as the new “collective problem” of 
copyright. There can be no denial that copyright has ceased to be an issue only for legal 
scholars, lawmakers or business executives. This reality has been made painfully clear 
in the academy, the sciences and in the public sphere with the rabid lawsuit tactics of 
industries and right’s holders over the past two decades. Copyright is no longer a 
problem of the few, it has forced itself into the public sphere and thus warrants a 
terminology that is less alienating, less obtrusive. It should not be surprising then, that 
we’ve simply never had one, as Jessica Litman points out: 
“We have never had a mechanism for members of the general public to exert influence 
on the drafting process to ensure the the statute does not burden private, non-
commercial, consumptive use of copyrighted works. The design of the drafting process 
(in which players with major economic stakes in the copyright sphere are typically 
invited dos it down and work out their differences before involving members of 
Congress in any new legislation) excludes ordinary citizens from the negotiating 
table.”  39
It goes without saying that such a structure gives credence to the idea that copyright is 
not something that the ordinary citizen should care about or would ever need concern. 
Litman continues, “It should also be unsurprising that many copyright holders insists 
that current copyright laws applies to everyone as literally written; there are no 
privileges or exemptions for the public because it would be inappropriate for members 
of the public to have them.”  Such an understanding of copyright is not only 40
inconsistent with legal practice, but goes again the legal logic enshrined in copyright 
throughout history. Furthermore, it denies that “American law has long recognized, first 
informally and later by statue, that a certain degree of copying, categorized as “fair 
 Jessica Litman, “Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age” Oregon Law Review 75/19 (1996): 39
2.
 Litman, “Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age,” 3.40
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use,” is acceptable.”  From the viewpoint of current stakeholders, people and 41
companies in current positions of power, this makes a lot of sense though. Given the 
expansion of copyright it is not surprising to hear that the public has not been privy to 
the proceedings of copyright thus far, but this must change. The need to understand 
concerns for the copyright are not simply specialized thinking. Because the common 
and communal nature of copyright, as a temporary exclusive right (what we might call a 
privilege) guaranteed by the federal government, is inherently political and deeply 
ingrained in democracy. As sociologist and music scholar Simon Frith has noted, 
“because rights regimes depend on legal regulation (rather than on market forces), the 
economics of rights cannot be discussed separately from the politics of rights.”  This 42
logic extends to the extensive, and growing, network of special interests and 
government lobbying on national and international levels just as much as it invokes the 
rights and interests of the public and their access to information, education and 
democratic discussion. Another crucial reason “common” is invoked here is drawn from 
the work of Lewis Hyde. Working upon a similar assumption: I understand that as 
American citizens we have inherited a cultural commons, which consists of art and 
ideas.  What Hyde describes as the vast collection of “human wit and imagination”––43
and it belongs to all of us. Ranging from the works of Shakespeare to knowledge of how 
to create aspirin, this information is extremely hard to exclude others from and it is by 
nature abundant, put another way, non-rival. The fact that one has knowledge and has 
enjoyed literary experiences of Shakespeare does not preclude another from having so 
whatsoever. Some of these were or are under copyright protection and this should 
remind us of the immensely intricate nature of copyright and its ability to effect our 
collective identities––in public and private. Thus, in developing an understanding of the 
 Litman, “Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age,” 4.41
 Simon Frith, “Music industry research: Where now? Where next? Notes from Britain” Popular Music 42
19/3 (Oxford: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 388.
 Hyde writes: “All that we make and do is shaped by the communities and traditions that contain us, not 43
to mention by money, power, politics, and luck. And even should the artist or scientist think she has 
extracted herself from the world to stand alone in the studio, a tremendous array of faculties and mind-
states may well attend her creativity,” (Common as Air 2011, 56). For an interesting analysis of Hyde’s 
assumptions see Fred Brandfon's, Review “Art Ownership: On Lewis Hyde’s “Common as Air”: Apr 
Books The American Poetry Review Vol. 40, No. 2 (American Poetry Review: 2011) 15.
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extant crisis, the fact of copyright’s reach cannot be overlooked,: it is one of public 
interest, it is a common concern. 
The second step in disentangling the crisis of copyright is to unpack the complex and 
interconnected relationship it has with the music industry. There can be no doubt that 
music, unlike other media has a special relationship with copyright, because unlike any 
other industry it relies upon it absolutely.  As copyright scholar Lee Marshall argued 44
back in 2005, “the music industry is currently at the heart of the new challenges facing 
intellectual property;” a statement that if said today would hardly be dated.  Nineteenth 45
century composers lobbied for protection of their compositions, which at the time were 
understood in terms of written works. Because of music’s unique relation to copyright it 
presents difficulties that we should be careful not to confuse crises of the music 
industries with those of the copyright world. That the much proclaimed “de-valuation of 
music” may have a connection with copyright is hardly enough to purport that copyright 
stands to bear the burden of guilt of explaining why. Such a narrative leads only to 
general result, one that might could been reached with an astonishing array of equations 
and computations. 
How then to distinguish them? Certain broad strokes can be made here. First, and most 
obviously, copyright does not apply to only music. This argument was referenced by 
Marshall in identifying how the music industry is an “exemplar” of the new problems 
facing intellectual property. Secondly, the tendency to conflate music and the music 
industries, or even “the music industry” with “music industries,” works only to supplant 
any critical notions of how the music we stream, hear in films or listen to on the radio is 
produced in reality ruling out all other possible ways to organize its production, 
dissemination, and experience of the audience. An example is useful. John Williamson 
and Martin Cloonan have modestly argued that “the notion of the single music industry 
 Lee Marshall Bootlegging: Romanticism and Copyright in the Music Industry, (London: SAGE 44
Publication ltd, 2005), 4.
 Lee Marshall, Bootlegging: Romanticism and Copyright in the Music Industry, 4.45
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is an inappropriate model for understanding and analyzing the economies and politics 
surrounding music.”  While Williamson and Cloonan choose to focus their critique to 46
the economic and the political their critique does a lot of the important groundwork for 
understanding the implications of discourse framing, or of talking about issues a certain 
way. For Williamson and Cloonan, we should adopt the the term “music industries 
(plural)” for the purposes of developing a clearer understanding of how these industries 
work and perhaps more importantly, the “designing of policies for them.” 
Primarily, the use of the term ‘music industry’ suggests a homogeneous industry when 
in fact there are a disparate set of industries, often in alliance but not too infrequently at 
odds. Additionally, the term ‘music industry’ is used all too often in reference to the 
‘recording industry’. In both cases the term ‘music industry’ leads to “misrepresentation 
and confusion,” and  “it suggests simplicity where there is complexity and homogeneity 
where there is diversity.”  This confusion, like the misrepresentation, is vectorized and 47
targeted at the public for the simple reason that it serves certain vested interests for the 
industries to remain indeterminate.  The problems are enough for Williamson and 48
Cloonan to argue that “the notion for single music industry is an inappropriate model for 
understanding and analyzing the economics and politics surrounding music.”   49
A third matter to disentangle is copyright’s relation to the music industry’s profit 
schemata. We would do well to remember that copyright can be said to be “in, but not of 
the market.” This serves as a reminder that it a federal guarantee (statutory law) and 
hardly anything “natural”. This ruling has on many occasions been reaffirmed. 
  John Williamson and Martin Cloonan, “Rethinking the Music Industry,” Popular Music 26/2, (2007): 46
305.
 Williamson & Cloonan, “Rethinking the Music Industry,” 305.47
 Williamson and Cloonan then layout the four most pressing places where this misrepresentation occurs: 48
(1) “Use by Representative and Umbrella Organizations”, such as BPI or the American ASCAP or RIAA, 
2) “Media Use”, including music publications such as Billboard, Music Week or even The Guardian 3) 
“Official Use” in governmental organizations and, 4) “Academic Use” dating at least back to the critiques 
of the staunch cultural industry critiques of Adorno. It was his production based thinking that may be the 
cause for the ‘over privileging.’
 Williamson & Cloonan, “Rethinking the Music Industry,” 305.49
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Originally, in the case Donaldson v. Beckett argued in the House of Lords in 1774 and 
more recently in 1834, where Judge McLean ruled in Wheaton v Peters, that common 
law protected personal letters or diaries, "this is a very different right from that which 
asserts a perpetual and exclusive property in the future publication of the work, after the 
author shall have published it to the world.”  Indeed, he continued, "Congress, then, by 50
this act, instead of sanctioning an existing right, as contended, created it.”  In this 51
sense, it is just like the oxymoronic “natural market forces” in “free market societies”. 
To make sure, the dispute is not that the ideas of expressions are not unadulterated 
thoughts, but that protection for original thoughts is not tied to whatever “natural,” 
“original” origin they may have. The relationship between art and copyright has this 
conceptual collusion in large part due to a proclivity to draw rhetorical connections and 
identify similar elements as constitutive of similar things. Failing to do so risks the 
slippery slope towards adopting pro-industry language––a lesser-recognized form of 
capitalist apologetics.  To be sure, the language of music industries commonly effects 52
the way we think about music and how we think about copyright. Indeed, the very idea 
of industry has changed how we talk about music and culture. Even before Adorno’s 
critique of the production-based cultural industry, fabrication had pervaded our thinking 
to such a degree that “the image or model whose shape sides the fabrication process not 
only precedes it, but does not disappear with the finished product.”  In our age, the age 53
of homo faber, our processual thinking guides our experience of works before their 
completion. The absolute reliance upon the law, a characteristic that defines music’s 
current relation to copyright, implicates the legal structure as a blueprint for its possible 
realization.  But copyright has never sold anything, that is, been the reason someone 54
bought something; and, it is decidedly should not be a means for sustaining industrial 
 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 at 658.50
 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. at 660–6151
 While conventional wisdom tell us that copyright is the necessary incentive for the creation of works, 52
history tells us that authors create works contrary to conventional wisdom. Much scholarship has gone 
into challenging the view of copyright presented by industry spokesmen and women, not to mention the 
economic travails and successes they submit as evidence for such travesties. The point is not to disavow 
copyright but to acknowledge its very real and formal relations with capitalism.
 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 141.53
 “The actual work of fabrication is performed under the guidance of a model in accordance with which 54
the object is constructed,” (Arendt 1998, 140).
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status quo. The tendency to conceptually conflate music, industry and copyright is not 
uncommon, only unproductive. That copyright has served many masters is not to its 
discredit however, rather, it points to its irreplaceable role in understanding modern 
creative practices. We must strive for an account of these relations that does not begin 
with the digitalization of everything, but acknowledges, rather, that “the current 
situation is a crisis long in the making.”  55
Copyright’s Existential Crisis
In 2009, law professor Ben Depoorter, declared: “Judging from the headlines, it appears 
that copyright law is in an existential crisis.”  The crisis has been going on for 56
sometime, arguably much longer than Depoorter’s article suggests. What is of particular 
interest for the present work is the change in discourse Depoorter identifies and 
represents. It would seem that the crisis is of a different degree now, it is somehow more 
existential in nature.”  The views advanced by many copyright advocates today point 57
to a difficultly in accounting for the thoughts of prior thinkers within copyright’s current 
bounds. What is more is that many formerly held arguments are now acknowledged as 
specious and romantic. But, “if these out-of-date beliefs are to be called myths, then 
myths can be produced by the same sorts of methods and held for the same sorts of 
reasons that now lead…” to historical knowledge.  To understand the crisis is then to 58
understand the problematics that arise within the present paradigm of copyright. To 
grasp the environment surrounding copyright, its conditions and possibilities, proves an 
invaluable tool to understanding its changes as much as its current state. 
When Depoorter speaks of an existential crisis of copyright law he is explicit about the 
juridical aspects despite his use of them as mathematical constants. In fact, the two 
assumptions that ground his argument are the “formative roles of legal uncertainty and 
 W. Ron Gard and Elizabeth Townsend Gard, “Marked by Modernism: Reconfiguring the “Traditional 55
Contours of Copyright Protection” for the Twenty-first Century” in Modernism & Copyright (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011) 157.
 Ben Depoorter “Technology and Uncertainty,” 1832.56
 Jens Schovsbo, “How to get it Copy-Right” in Art and Law: The Copyright Debate, edited by Morten 57
Rosenmeier & Stina Teilmann (Copenhagen: DJØF Publishing, 2005). p. 25.
 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1970), 2.58
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legal delay.”  The legislative nature of copyright appears to be always already unstable; 59
either utterly inapplicable in light of technological development or predicated on an old 
model of things and thus unfit for grounds of enforcement. This kind of out-of-dateness 
hardly justifies terming it an existential crisis though. An existential crisis is typically a 
situation where individuals are forced to question the very foundations of their lives, to 
ask whether or not it has any meaning, purpose or value––not if they’ve fallen behind 
and need an update. To be fair, Depoorter does not seem to suggest that at the end of the 
day copyright law has lost its purpose. Which begs the question, what exactly is 
different about the present and how does it relate to the crisis? Legal theories are of little 
help here. For one, all laws are in effect, post facto. There are not speed limits prior to 
someone speeding and either risking, endangering or taking life or property. The 
conceptual confusion between what is protected, why it is protected and what deserves 
protection only complicates the issue. 
The move to personify a piece of legislation may be a mere turn of phrase, a product of 
grammatical coherence or rhetorical conviction, but it also betrays a trend in 
recognizing a rich subterranean humanity at play in discussions of copyright. The 
humanity at play in copyright is tied to a sense of self-understanding, whether (identity 
laws in copyright) or a “natural order” (traditional contours imply every works eventual 
placement into the public domain) that when questioned and/or broken renders an 
individual and their work lost or unsure of the future. To anthropomorphize laws or 
interpretations of laws is indeed a rhetorical gesture, and as such, not an empty one. In 
fact, as I showed within the history of music copyright there is precedent for doing so. 
Early music copyright likened melody to “the fingerprints of a musical work, the 
primary index of a piece’s singularity.”  The emphasis is not mere wordplay but the 60
very value of argumentation. In 1909 speaking of various aspects of music in such 
 Depoorter, “Technology and Uncertainty,” 1867.59
 Joanna Demers, “Melody, Theft and High Culture” in Modernism and Copyright, 130. Furthermore, the 60
stipulation of the law according the Copyright Act of 1909 was that any cover not change “the basic 
melody or fundamental character of the work.” 17 U.S.C. §115(a)(2).
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personal tones, even material fingerprints, was the standard. But in the wake of the 
Copyright Act of 1976 the law changed. Up until the latter part of the twentieth century 
the expression of music had been the penned lyrics or the written notes and the idea 
existed in the composer’s head. “Now that copyright protects all sounds fixed in a 
recording, however, the category of expression includes not just notation but the full 
range of audio phenomena that arises from recorded performance of the score.”  61
Similarly, changes in identify of composers and how they imagine their work has 
produced a difference way of listening. As composers and musicians have needed to 
adapt to the new parameters of the law so as not to be accused or convicted of copyright 
violation, they have had to become more conscious of how all sounds have become 
equally important to the song and not any particular tune, ditty or melody. To notice a 
“borrowed” bass line or a sampled track is often just the point. Hence the tendency to 
identify an artist with their sound. This figure of speech has been the result of a 
mutually constructive relation between music and copyright. 
The tendency of wanting to pinpoint the problem often results in the easy claim that 
technology is at the root of the problem. Those most often arguing this line 
simultaneously call for technology to resolve the problem too, however. There can be no 
doubt that technological change has indeed produced unexpected situations, which, in 
turn, has caused copyright to address new phenomena utterly ill-equipped. But less so 
because copyright was weak or uninterested in protecting original creations and more 
along the lines of it couldn’t have imagined the LP in 1879 or television in 1909 and so 
couldn’t account for it––yet. “And so” Depoorter writes, “time after time, technological 
advancements have affected copyright law by demanding answers to difficult questions 
regarding the scope of the law.”  But these technological advancements have 62
challenged law makers for centuries and furthermore, a quick look at copyright 
transformation indicates that issues concerning the scope of the law have only involved 
their expansion over the past century. One need only think of developments in 
cartography, the printing press, the player piano and the gramophone, the record player, 
 Joanna Demers, “Melody, Theft and High Culture,” 131.61
 Ben Depoorter, “Technology and Uncertainty,” 1839.62
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cd’s, computers, all long before the internet or mp3. In short, technology, or at least 
technological change, seems hardly fit to provide a comprehensive account for the 
present crisis either. 
Depoorter seems to acknowledge this technology loop, even if it is the product of 
convenience for right’s holders:  
“When copyright owners feel that the law adapts too slowly and fails to offer adequate protection, they 
invest in antipiracy-protection (sic) technologies. This investment, in turn, motivates users to invest in 
circumvention technologies, creating an arms race between content owners and pirates in which the very 
technology that is used to create a lock can be used to pick it.”  63
Thus, copyright stakeholders take the law into their own hands when they “feel” so and 
this feeling produces an arms race. This notion of copyright sounds more like tax 
loopholes, publicity stunts and privatization of public services towards furthering 
empire. This is however, specific to rights regimes. As I mentioned early, rights regimes 
are reliant upon legal, which in the case of the United States is effectively state 
sponsored enforcement of free market forces. We see that the guiding framework rest 
upon a question that, again, turns upon not so much what does copyright mean but what 
would it have to have meant to make it capable of an existential crisis? The law as 
described is blatant control, discipline and order amidst a storm; and, technology as the 
waves bashing against the hull of property.  Again, such a description implicitly 64
ignores those individuals for whom the law applies, from whom the law derives its 
power–the public. Might the existential crisis of copyright that Depoorter references be 
a crisis of the public? Has the American public lost all faith in copyright “to promote the 
progress of science and useful arts” through the federal guarantee? Copyright scholar, 
Siva Vaidhyanathan, writes, “Copyright is a ‘deal’ that the American people, through its 
congress, made with the writes and publishers of books.”  Is the deal off the table?  65 66
 Ben Depoorter, “Technology and Uncertainty,” 1839.63
  The argument presented here is a caricature, but scholars such as Ulrich Beck have noted through 64
concepts such as second modernity and knowledge society the inherent risks modern society has 
become aware of, and been forced to endure. That this reflexivity provides strong enough evidence to 
justify the strengthening law is hardly substantiated though.
 Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, (New York: NYU Press, 2003), 21.65
 The situation of copyright, be it crisis, is not the mere standard process of ‘growing up’, rather, it has a 66
specific historical function in the failure of a belief and a series of expectations: “Legitimacy becomes a 
subject of discussion only when it is disputed,” (Blumenberg 1983, 97).
!32
Limitations of Crisis
For Nietzsche it was a loss of collective faith in religion or traditional morality that 
constituted the grounds for an existential crisis. If the existential crisis of copyright is a 
collective loss of faith, then what deal have we lost faith in and can be said of the 
culture that produced it? The “deal” I have already alluded to, and legal scholars such as  
 Neil Netanel, have written convincingly about the changes in approaches to the public 
and democratic foundations of copyright. The culture of copyright likewise, spans the 
distance from America’s Founding Fathers to hip-hop artists of the 21st century. 
Questions of historical methodology necessarily arise: how can arguments be made 
across such historical spans without a modicum of recognizability in the first place? 
What counts is this modicum of similarity? Who decides what counts? I argue that 
certain “identity conditions”, certain “structural continuities” must exists for historical 
arguments to hold water in identifying similarities between historical events. 
One such way is to examine the semantic translations that occur over time. This 
dialogical thinking posits that these changes are not the result of new questions to old 
answers though. Rather, these semantic translations point to a tendency to cover-up or 
smuggle political agendas in the guise of new conceptual thinking. Concepts, such as 
author, work and audience have changed and will no doubt continue to change with 
various stakes for politics and economy. What is of prime importance, for Blumenberg, 
are certain “carry over questions;” those problems that were not adequately answered in 
the past or have yet to be abandoned in the present that make the identity of historical 
processes but not their content. Rather, there is a subterranean basis to such conceptual 
outgrowths. As Koselleck has argued in Futures Past, “history is only able to recognize 
what continually changes, and what is new, if it has access to the conventions within 
which lasting structures are concealed.”  The metaphorical underpinning advanced here 67
takes concepts and re-implicates them into the logic of the lived world. For 
Blumenberg, this constitutes the foundational aspect of metaphors, the foundation upon 
 Koselleck, Future Past, 275.67
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which without orientation, thought and action would be inefficacious. To think about 
this in terms of a cartography, the expansion of the copyright regime brings in new and 
different territories under the banner. This does not however, lead to more of the same, 
but, rather, at each turn to new ways of being territorial.  68
To this end, this work engages with several dominant concepts within copyright and 
posits a metaphorological approach rooted in the foundational understandings of 
property and its reoccupation. What I term propertization seeks to shed light on certain 
rhetorical, material and economic arguments behind the advance of copyright 
expansion. What is not argued is the existence of some consistent impulse to resolve the 
question of property, hence my terminology propertization. Rather, propertization refers 
to new “positions”, or set of problems, within a framework of possible orientation, 
thought and action in the world. It aims to reflect the internal maneuvers and 
contradictory motivations within contemporary copyright culture and law. In one sense 
this effects the confines of time, predominately understood as duration and expectation, 
and on another the spatial limitations, the growth of works covered by copyright as well 
as the ways and measures they are protected.  69
The functional reoccupation of copyright has changed dramatically: from censorship 
and regulation by the Queen, to commercialization and legitimization of the artist as 
individual, to the expansion of the notions of art and professionalization of the artist, to  
’sustainability’ within a capitalist market structure. Instead, propertization allows us to 
see the matrix of needs, expectations and questions that unite these overlapping 
paradigms. We can ascertain a sense of the scope of the crisis once we have recognized 
a particular trajectory of it having come into being as a crisis and its unique relation to 
the future. As Koselleck has cogently argued, “the entire sociopolitical linguistic 
 See William Rankin’s, After the Map: Cartography, Navigation, and the Transformation of Territory in 68
the Twentieth Century, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016). Perhaps, nowhere is is most 
powerfully exemplified by the DMCA (Digital Millennium Copyrights Act) of 1998 and the creation 
of new digital and technological controls. 
 “A consistent discovery in the following studies is the fact that the more a particular time is 69
experienced as a new temporality, as “modernity,” the more that demands made of the future increase. 
Special attention is therefore devoted to a given present and its condition as a superseded former 
future,” (Koselleck Futures Past, 3).
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domain is generated by the progressively emerging tension between experience and 
expectation.”  To this end, the crisis in copyright might be seen as part of the crisis of 70
creative production itself. One might ask: “what is the position of creativity in society?” 
While another might pursue a more pragmatic approach that draws from the merely 
abstract. Instead the questions might be phrased: how is it tied to our past and what can 
it do for our future? To stake out ground for formulating responses to these questions in 
relation to copyright we must take account of one major translation, one I believe can 
help develop our understanding the extant crisis: the abandonment of an authorial past 
for a propertied future.  
 Koselleck, Futures Past, 274.70
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II. Background Metaphorics 
of Copyright
All things are subject to interpretation.  
Whichever interpretation prevails at a given  
time is a function of power and not truth.  
  –Friedrich Nietzsche 
Understood historically, copyright cannot be described in terms of its general contents: 
author, property, law, but, rather, by its function. In fact, these largely heterogenous 
characteristics often serve to represent copyright like some conceptual shorthand, but 
always at the expense of understanding its function. While much discussion surrounding 
copyright seems intent to focus on the external forces shaping a nebulous kernel of 
truth, some essential copyright, recent thought has frowned upon essential arguments. 
This tendency to seek out some essential core to copyright is the prerequisite for 
denying the mutable social relations that constitute its possibility: “But for all that law 
shapes works of culture, it is itself, quintessentially, a work shaped; indeed, one could 
say that nothing is more “made” than law.” Particularly, because this rational ultimately 
lacks explanatory power when asking about the conditions constituting the crisis of 
copyright or how it might have come about. An essential understanding of copyright 
fails to answer how the essence of copyright could have undergone such a radical 
transformation into its inverse, from limited right and public interest to an expansive 
regime of rights used to harness private profit on a global scale. In light of the collective 
heritage I will argue that only within copyright is such a transformation accountable on 
account of the historical conditions identified earlier. The modern extent crisis is the 
product of an immanent historical process within copyright itself. 
Seen in the long dureé, a such a model of copyright does not slide into a comfortable 
teleology––from a former limited right towards its more fuller, robust version. The 
modern status as moral bludgeon and gavel for the conviction and punishment of 
“pirates” betrays a conceptual “reoccupation,” one less of consensus than one of 
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inheritance and special interest.  These substantial elements may provide compelling 71
evidence for a number of copyright’s various “positions” but they do not account for its 
transformations. The specious essential element of copyright is only possible to imagine 
if copyright, after having been drug through history, emerged suddenly freed of any 
historical mortgage. If we are to resist this teleological approach to copyright we must 
be able to account for a continuity to copyright that acknowledges those positions it has 
occupied and those it has retreated from. By adopting a cartographic approach, a view 
of ‘the topography of copyright’ reveals a marked history, akin to a palimpsest. The 
multitude of arguments surrounding the production of creative works and their 
renumeration have used copyright as the occasion, not as the tool to discuss the ordering 
of relations. The general sentiment that copyright has some ‘readiness to hand’, some 
immediate use-value is an inverted modern crystallized conception. Somehow we have 
managed to turn land into an estate, transformed the occasion into the justification. This 
process is more than likely the product of our process-oriented thinking. A pathological 
thinking that aims to determine how copyright might do what it needs to do to recover 
or overcome the crisis, but one that simultaneously avoids addressing what copyright is. 
This is because the nature of one’s undertaking is deeply determined by the problem one 
is addressing. 
The tendency to speak abstractly of the conceptional armature of copyright needs to be 
replaced with an understanding of the function of copyright: not how it does, but what it 
does. The question cannot be how the modern rights regime describes or resists what 
came before it but what means allow for its extension and the production of new power 
structures. Once Upon a Time in Shaolin exemplifies these latent structures in copyright 
and supplies a vivid imagery for charting their various constellations. By exploring the 
background metaphorics and the foregrounded rhetorics a compelling narrative for 
understanding copyright’s historical transformations. To get there though we take a 
short detour through the legal cocoon of copyright.  
 “This is the story about private interests, vested interests, and the inexorable pace of technological 71




That the language of law strives to become streamlined logic and pure concept for the 
sake of eliminating misunderstanding seems self-apparent, and in many ways, as it 
should be. James Freund writes of the legal craftsman, “He is engaged in an endless 
struggle to rid the language of ambiguity and exterminate half-truths.”  He continues, 72
“conclusions are conclusive unless clearly labeled tentative; the unexplained assumption 
is dangerous; the unattributed statement, anathema.”  There is however, the realistic 73
acceptance that language has not yet arrived at this state of pure sensibility. Provided 
that it had, we would “have to relinquish any justifiable interest in researching the 
history of its concepts.”  As Blumenberg points out in the case of philosophy, seen 74
from a view of completion, history would only serve to identify failed fledging attempts 
at understanding, those necessary but destructive moments of unrealized thought. 
Thinking of language as the horses pulling the chariot of progress has had dangerous 
consequences. This type of eternal certainty was however, deemed to belong exclusively 
to the creator and his creation and put to rest some time back so long as we mortals 
realized that all that remained, “the world of our images and artifacts, our conjectures 
and projections–in short, the universe of our ‘imagination,’” was our concern.  The 75
backdrop of these conceptual transformations then, the dark infinite sky that gives cause 
to looking at the whirl of the celestial bodies sheds light on that something ancillary to 
the light of conceptual thought.  
Copyright as an idea seems straight forward enough, but once historicized it fails to be 
the clear conception in practice. Changes within the law are numerous. What is of 
particular interest for this study is not in recognizing that changes are many and 
particular, nor that such changes fail to account for some “progress” in copyright, but 
that these changes correlate to changes in experience and expectation. As I hope to 
 James C. Freund, Lawyering: A Realistic Approach to Legal Practice, (New York: Law Journal 72
Seminars-Press, Inc., 1979), 47.
 Hans Blumenberg, Paradigms for a Metaphorology, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), 48.73
 Blumenberg, Paradigms for a Metaphorology, 2.74
 Blumenberg, Paradigms for a Metaphorology, 2.75
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show, thinking about the relations between experience and expectation in a 
technologically reforming world grants novel interpretations of more recent changes in 
copyright culture and law. Notions of legal precedent, our sense of the sanctity of law, 
even terminology such as the ‘traditional contours of copyright’ work to distance law 
from fraternizing with frivolous or sudden change. Even when radical changes within 
US law occur, they’re evoked as if they always fit within the legal teleology: freedom of 
speech, the abolition of slavery, women’s suffrage and the sale of alcohol are all labeled 
amendments. This title works to confer some sense of longevity to the legal regime. 
Things are as they have been, or they can simply be tacked on to an already functioning 
whole. This image is one where law moves slow, so it goes without saying that a more 
complex grasp of transformations within the law or interpretational schemata of the law 
are not common knowledge. Indeed, it goes against the moral injection the law bears 
within it. In light of this reality, it is easier to find structural similarities to the 
transformations within copyright law in other fields as reference points. Before 
beginning though, to chart out the changes in copyright we need to justify what counts 
as a change. 
One way to do this is to break up copyright into its various “positions” or 
“paradigms.”  When talking about changes in copyright I could refer to copyright 76
within a particular period of time, within a national border, or in connection to a new 
technology and much scholarship has proceed along these lines.  (The national border 77
 The notion of a paradigm here is not used in contrast to position, it is used loosely and synonymously. It 76
works to inject a certain direction and dynamic attribute into the static position. In this sense, a 
position is always only temporary––or at least never forever––whether it is abandoned or occupied. 
In respect to copyright, the authorial “position” can be said to be the conceptual framework for 
attracting a lasting group of individuals (scholars, industry officials, public officials, citizens, etc.,) 
away from alternative models of thinking about copyright (public interest, property rights, originality) 
while providing them with enough stability and unanswered questions to justify its endurance. While 
positions or paradigms attract lasting groups of adherents who work within them over differing spans 
of time, they are not ever necessarily consciously selected at any point. It might help to think of them 
more abstractly, more akin to the positions we take in an argument than an actual location although 
history testifies to a correlation between the two. Positions then, may engender coherent traditions or 
destroy them, but they have always a working agreement of fundamentals, be they rules, standards or 
methods.
 Copyright scholarship is full of accounts of early copyright, European vs American notions of 77
copyright, german vs french and more recently, a plethora of accounts of the certain digital demise of 
culture industries. Music was not included in the list of possible works capable of receiving copyright 
protection until the 1800’s. It was not until the Copyright Act of 1831 that musical compositions were 
protected by copyright, which still did not include public performances. This is most clearly a carry 
over of a literature based thinking.
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will remain the United States of America and any general statements about EU 
jurisprudence only serve to illustrate American exceptionalism.)  These positions are 78
shaky grounds to formulate differences, however. Like sand on the shore, each of these 
categories lies nestled in historical epochs that constantly take on new shapes in light of 
our recent discoveries. Work by Benedict Anderson has argued for acknowledging the 
imaginary comportment and composition of the modern nation state and the notion of 
nationalities more broadly; and, identifying transformations in copyright in relation to 
new technologies risks a certain bland technological determinism or digital utopianism 
that does not accurately reflect the reality of copyright.  So how do we distinguish the 79
positions of copyright?  
As the law strives for a certain clarity in terms and procedure of thought it proceeds 
along a trajectory of resurfacing the landscape within its domain. In this sense, the law 
produces the facts it allegedly stumbles upon.  Scholars have noted that the productive 80
capacity of law includes “subjects and the subject positions it affords,” including the 
Marxist insight into the conditions for the production, interpellation and ideological 
adoption of a “possessive, rights-bering subject.”  Following the work of scholars like 81
Rosemary J. Coombe, we would do well to shift our thought to consider how subjects 
 “Copyright laws of a country have no extraterritorial application. Nevertheless, practically every nation 78
in the world, by adherence to either bilateral or multilateral treaties of conventions, protects the 
copyrights of foreign nationals,” (Cramer 1965, 531). The global agenda of right’s holders is hardly a 
secret however; US foreign trade agreements have largely bullied countries into reforming their 
stances on intellectual property rights as a condition for approval.
 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (2011). As Rosemary J. Coombe has argued, the emergence 79
of new holders of intellectual property under the auspices of international treaties, connections and 
customs: “in these transnational processes, communities are in important way imagined, “traditions” 
are often invented and “cultures” seem to be emerging everywhere in legal guise,” (Coombe 2011, 
83). The question of technology will be addressed at more length in the following chapter but suffice 
it to say now that copyright has not responded to or shaped new technologies individually or 
uniquely, however we might define them; and, furthermore, right’s holders and users are hardly 
suspended apart from technological changes themselves, but are often, in fact, instigating them for 
their own profit and benefit. On the other hand, one need only think of the Statue of Anne in the wake 
of the printing press or the introduction of the CD as technological markers for accumulating power, 
profit and capital.
 See Rosemary J. Coombe, “Cultural Agencies” in Making and Unmaking Intellectual Property: 80
Creative Production in Legal and Cultural Perspective, The University of Chicago Press (Chicago: 
2011), 81.
 Coombe, “Cultural Agencies,” 80. She writes elsewhere, “The law must be understood not simply as an 81
institutional forum of legitimating discourse to which social groups turn to have preexisting 
difference recognized but, more crucially, as a central locus for the control and dissemination of those 
signifying forms with which difference is made and remade” (Coombe 1998: 37).
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and the world they make their way in, replete with its various opportunities and 
impossibilities, is produced by the law and not limit ourselves to concerns over how the 
law corresponds to, or fails to accurately reflect, lived realities. In doing so, changes in 
copyright might be be understood in terms of the changes in the positions it occupies, 
and the experiences of music it makes possible. The structural turn in legal discourse to 
the relations and conditions that give rise to possible subjects and their personalities, 
away from a model of fully finished and complete subjects, has tremendous purchase 
for copyright. 
The Reoccupation of the Authorial Position 
I think it is safe to say that the majority of discussions surrounding copyright revolve 
around the author–––most notably of the ‘Romantic” variety. I will call this 
constellation of relations centered on or anchored in authorial presence in a work the 
“authorial position” or “authorial paradigm” of copyright. It is no understatement to say 
that the “authorial position,” largely in the form of critiques of authorship, dominates 
much of copyright literature.  Take Shamans, Software, and Spleens: Law and the 82
Construction of the Information Society, in which James Boyle advances a theory of 
“romantic authorship,” which he claims is behind much of contemporary intellectual 
property doctrine. A central point of the work argues that authors have too much power 
within the modern IP regimes, and particularly so in reference to copyright––a position I 
hold as well. But where Boyle’s analysis sees the “romantic author” as the main driving 
force behind the expansion of copyright I argue that it has been superseded by another. 
The romantic author may remain a vital, albeit auxiliary, force in copyright expansion, 
the authorial position has been in large part abandoned by major right’s holders and 
reoccupied by the paradigm of property. 
There are several reasons for this coming to pass. The first critique of the romantic 
author is its dearth of explanatory power when considering the legal rules in practice. 
  See the work of Roland Barthes, James Boyle, Rosemary J. Coombe, Cathy Davidson, Michel 82
Foucault, Peter Jaszi, Martha Woodmansee, Mark Rose for valuable critiques concerning western 
notions of authorship and their relation to copyright.
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The ease of slipping into a model of unique genius producing great works is well 
documented, but this paradigm tells us nothing about “limited terms” or constrained 
rights within the modern copyright regime. Secondly, a long-term historical 
development of copyright cannot be accounted for under the rubric of romantic 
authorship. From early copyright law in England, starting with the Statue of Anne in 
1709, the claim has been used a “straw man” for publishers until the later creation of the 
professional author and up until the death of the author in the 1960’s. Vaidhynathan 
writes, “although the author was mentioned as the beneficiary of the statue, the act was 
really another regulation of the practice of printing and selling books, not writing them, 
and a recognition of the pubic’s interest in the process.”  No manuscript was worth 83
selling until an author had signed over the rights to the publisher––the only real player 
in legal and commercial game. What the law did do however, was give the work a 
timeline: after a work had outlived its term of protection (originally fourteen years) it 
would fall into the public domain and be under control of the public. But while early 
copyright might have operated within and at times occupied the authorial position (even 
if more as a bivouac with the intention to exploit rather than to extol), the position has 
largely been abandoned now. 
Largely due to the fact that, “there are numerous aspects of intellectual property law that 
not only cannot be explained by the romantic authorship theory, but which seem 
affirmatively inimical to it.”  These fall into two broad categories for law Professor 84
Mark Lemley: the rules regarding ownership of intellectual property are largely in favor 
of corporations, not individual authors or inventors. The work-for-hire doctrine doctrine 
is official testament to this notion but it is common knowledge that “for many classes of 
works, including books, movies, and music it is de rigeur for the artist to assign the 
copyright to the publisher, producer, or studio.”  The second category notes that 85
virtually every modern author is a user of prior works, so the idea that copyright law 
 Vaidhynathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 40.83
 Mark Lemley, “Book Review––Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property,” in Texas Law 84
Review (1997): 873-906. 15. See also Stewart E. Sterk’s “Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law” in 
Michigan Law Review 94/5 (1996); and more generally, Jessica Litman, “Revising Copyright Law for 
the Information Age.” Oregon Law Review 75/19 (1996).
 Lemley, “Review,” 16.85
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privileges the unique author at the expense of what came before fails to account for the 
fact that a current reading of copyright rules “are susceptible to exactly the opposite 
interpretation––that they give initial creators far too much control over the work of 
transformative improvers.”  The authorial paradigm doesn’t give a firm footing to side 86
with either author or the improver, the older or the newer author. A fourth problem with 
the paradigm of romantic authorship is that it doesn’t account for modern changes in 
copyright law. Not only does the logic of the romantic author paradigm resist any 
argument for change of any sort, but it also proves feeble before the task of 
understanding the particular changes it has undergone.  I would add to the list of 87
criticisms that such focus on the author is a distraction from the real politics at hand. As 
Vaidhynathan has argued: “If we continue to skewer the ‘straw man’ of authorship with 
our dull scholarly bayonets, we will miss teethe important issues: ownership, control, 
access, and use.”   88
While the “authorial position” has been largely abandoned, arguments nonetheless 
continue to be launched from within its borders and the questions it raised, limited as 
they were to the area provided by the theoretical structure, have hardly simply 
disappeared. With its collapse, the central role it had in establishing a territory to proffer 
answers to the questions of how to imagine and structure the delicate balance between 
incentivizing creative individuals to produce creative works for the benefit and in the 
interest of a democratic public, resulted in vacating a position and therefore leaving it 
open to be reoccupied. It is important to note just what the authorial paradigm provided 
though. It shaped the model for framing the relations between an author, an audience 
and the state. What later failed to provide adequate grounds for answering questions of 
increasing practical concern, such as what kind of protection should be guaranteed or 
how to assess the appropriate length of duration, faired equally poorly in responding to 
 Lemley, “Review,” 18.86
 Copyright was originally available for application and at a maximum of fourteen years of protection 87
before eligibility for another fourteen. It has grown to the life of the author plus seventy years. 
Romantic authorship, it seems, fails to answer why there would be any limitations at all. Furthermore, 
the ‘straw man’ of the Stationer’s cannot explain the development of authorial professionalization, its 
subsequent downgrade to “work-for-hire” status and then corporatization. 
 Siva Vaidhynathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 11. See also Pamela Anderson “The Copyright Grab” 88
Wired, (1996).
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questions of a kind never before imagined, like those brought on by technological 
advancement and the growing importance of capital. In leu of this abandonment, the 
modern idea of property, although virtually concurrent while the authorial paradigm, 
“reoccupied” the central position for conceptualizing copyright. This reoccupation 
created a vacuum of possible answers to discarded questions such as artist identity, the 
importance of originality, the justifications for various types of rights (particularly when 
belonging to cooperate entities) and the logic behind such financial incentives.  
Similarly, the reoccupation helped to provide answers to questions long left unanswered 
while also raising new questions of its own. It was this propertization, replete with a 
new set of questions and their more recent derivations that, I will argue, constitutes the 
background metaphorics necessary for understanding the extant crisis in copyright 
today.  The fact that authorial arguments continue to dominate copyright scholarship, 89
policy and popular conceptions of copyright is not evidence of the weakness of the 
property paradigm; but, instead, serves as testament to the “reoccupation” of the 
authorial position by property. 
Mapping the Metaphors 
Before continuing on, I want to ground this view of metaphors in the various positions 
of copyright. The study of metaphors has been a valuable approach in literary 
jurisprudence but with the literary turn in historical analysis metaphors have taken a 
more central role in the understanding of understanding.  To locate the dominant 90
metaphors within the “authorial” or “property position” amounts to a staking out the 
terrain within which these metaphors could be grounded and to test the criteria by which 
they can be comprehended and mapped. Thus, in arguing that the authorial position was 
dominated by the metaphor of the ‘romantic author’ I contend that certain foundational 
 The derivations I refer to can be summed up in the neoliberal investment market strategies of 89
speculative real-estate and monopoly rent theories.
 See works such as Ian Ward’s “On Literary Jurisprudence” Journal of Law and Interdisciplinary 90
Studies (2011), Guyora Binder and Robert Weinberg’s “Cultural Criticism of Law” Stanford Law 
Review (1997), William Patry’s Moral Panics and the Copyright Wars, Julie E. Cohen’s “Creativity 
and Culture in Copyright Theory Georgetown University Law Center (2007), Stephan Larson’s 
Metaphors and Norms: Understanding copyright law in a digital society (Lund University: 2011) and 
more generally Hayden White’s The Fiction of Narrative Johns Hopkins University Press (2010) and 
The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation, Johns Hopkins 
University Press (1987).
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elements to the framework for conceptualizing authorship, originality, publication, 
audience, even ideas and access have already been assumed. The legalistic idea of 
ownership by virtue of being an individual, let alone an author was an incredibly 
compelling metaphor, one whose relevance continues to prevail in fields and discourses 
outside the realm of copyright. The metaphor provided a place to stand firmly in one’s 
burgeoning eighteenth-century individualism and the convictions of genius and 
intelligence that nutrients it still today. The authorial metaphor had been taken from the 
creator god and given unto man thereby collect a new assortment of markers by which 
we might give ourselves new names. As such, an individual could be recognized, 
remembered and celebrated in the modern world. The metaphorics of authorship 
grounded any thesis concerning them by providing theoretical and pragmatic accounts 
of the world such that thought, action and orientation were possible and meaningful.  91
In Paradigms for a Metaphorology, Blumemnberg addressed the question straight on by 
asking: “What role do metaphors play in philosophical language?” Given the fact that 
language has not reached the level of clarity once sought by thinkers like Descartes, 
how do we account for its instability? Blumenberg proposes that metaphors might be 
thought of as “leftovers elements,” byproducts of our long journey from mythos to 
logos; or, we posit them as “foundational elements” of philosophical language.  In this 92
foundational sense, the ‘translational’ character they acquired in the development from 
myth to logic seeped into ground our modern thought is built upon. They “resist being 
converted back into authenticity and logicality” and remain irredeemably expressive in 
function.  We cannot ask questions of them but find them already asked in the 93
foundation of existence. In this sense, metaphors such as the “light of truth” or the 
“naked truth” contain a history in a much more radical sense then the concept of truth 
would allow. Such a distinction for philosophical language would be, of course, 
dramatic. To suggest that such ‘absolute metaphors’ might ground our thought is 
 “The origin of the modern age’s acute methodological reflection thus essential lies in the need not to 91
have to accept and passively receive the truth, but to ground it fundits denuo [totally anew]––‘ground’ 
understood not just in the sense of coming up with the grounds for a thesis but of producing the thesis 
itself from its grounds,” (Blumenberg, Paradigms, 31).
 Blumenberg, Paradigms for a Metaphorology, 3.92
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tantamount to understanding the teleology of a logicalization in language to be 
grounded on such “leftover elements” itself. Blumenberg’s speculative thinking 
amounts to a radically new relation between the imagination and logic. Indeed, such 
thinking buries down to systemic relations to ascertain the ‘courage’ of the mind to 
identify not necessary what something is, but what it ought to be for us and its possible 
uses. For Blumenberg, this provides metaphor with its unique value: “unlike a concept, 
a metaphor does not have a referential but a pragmatic function. Its content determines, 
like an orienting reference, a conduct; it gives structure to a world; it represents that 
which cannot be experienced, incomprehensible: the totality of reality.”   94
Thus, while scholars such as Vaidhyanathan have argued for academics to take a more 
active role in encouraging public debate about copyright issues, a position I believe in 
as well, I argue that the need for conceptual clarity (nature of the author or “piracy”) is 
as much part of the problem as part of the solution. Not only is conceptual clarity itself 
very hard to attain due to differing interpretations, legalese and the intricacies of 
exceptions and arcane global treatises, it has produced little actual change in copyright 
policy. Instead of the hard slog to carve out some conceptual clarity, these conceptions, 
regardless of their varied manifestations, remains fixed within an abstract totality whose 
relations of power, in part, constitute the very crisis of copyright they purportedly aim to 
resolve.  A quick example will be of use to indicate how metaphors suggest much more 95
than they at present appear to. Vaidhynathan passionately writes, “What happens when 
all questions of authorship, originality, use and access to ideas and expressions become 
framed in the terms of ‘property rights’? The discussion ends. There is no powerful 
property argument that can persuade a people concerned about rewarding ‘starving 
artists’ not to grant the maximum possible protection. How can one argue for ‘theft’?”   96
  Elías José Palti, “From Ideas to Concepts To Metaphors: The german Tradition of Intellectual History 94
and the Complex Fabric of Language,” History and Theory, 49/2 (2010): 205.
 Nietzsche critiques in The Difference Between Good and Evil the ‘Innate systemtism and relationship 95
of concepts” which is “in fact not so much a discovering as a recognizing,” (Nietzsche, Between 
Good and Evil, 31). 
 Vaidhynathan, Copyright and Copywrongs, 12.96
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Metaphors do not merely seek to identify the relationship between the author and her 
creation, but the entire world of art that consumers and producers inhabit. The authorial 
position likewise managed to produce an entire industry around the relations it 
advocated. Being absolute though, these metaphors all but negate protestations or the 
possibility of another way to imagine the relationships. Because it is, after all, these 
relationships that are of central importance. The relations between individuals in society 
is what is at stake, not mere capital.  Property at once served the interests of authors to 97
establish their professional status if only to overtake them as the dominate mode of 
structuring the relations within the world of copyright, and with an alarming efficiency 
and profound consequences. 
Property has been at the center of copyright discussions long before the ‘intellectual’ 
was added. “The use of ‘property’; as a metaphor when considering copyright questions 
is not new. The earliest landmark case in British copyright discuss, “the great question 
of literary property.”  In the United States it can be traced back to Mark Twain and his 98
infamous tirade to invoke property talk “to shift the debate away from what was good 
for American at large to what would benefit successful authors.”  Twain’s notoriety 99
grew the more he collected signatures and spoke before congress, noting, “a day would 
come when, in the eyes of the law, literary property will be as sacred as whiskey, or any 
other of the necessities of life.”  While notions of property arose they did so for 100
particular reasons, namely towards establishing the author as the benefactor of the work, 
even when the author was more of a straw man for the profiteering publishers. Twain’s 
efforts, while largely fruitless during his life, bring to light the reality of American 
republican ideals often clashing with property interests. They did continued to do so into 
the 20th century. 
 Vaidhynathan, Copyright and Copywrongs, 11.98
 Vaidhynathan, Copyright and Copywongs, 11.99
 Vaidhynathan, Copyright and Copyrights, 56.100
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Foregrounding Rhetoric
Scholar Mark Lemley has noted, “The idea of propertization begins with a fundamental 
shift in the rhetoric of intellectual property law.”  Dating back to early views of 101
property Mark Rose has documented the view of authors as owners; an idea, drawn 
from the Lockean notion of property’s foundation in labor. But recent resort to charges 
of “theft” versus “infringement”––a far more morally neutral term–––may incline 
judges to punish the former more easily. Theft invokes a property logic whereas 
infringement suggests a petty violation. Much scholarship has been applied towards 
arguing for the public benefit of thinking of information as property. Others have 
acknowledged the rhetorical shift and are combatting it. What is most certain is that the 
Supreme Court acknowledges it.  Property notions may have been traditionally drawn 102
from common law property rights and incentive approaches, but more recent intellectual 
property notions are generally clustered behind the Chicago School Law-and-economics 
movement, generally labeled the Neoclassical approach, stressing rational expectations, 
price theory and private ownership.  This turn within the economics of copyright 103
exemplifies the latest and most complete abandonment of the authorial position and the 
near total reoccupation of it by property. The incentive approach, usually argued on the 
basis of limited terms to keep free-riders out of the system is seen as “crude” and “two-
dimensional” to the neoclassical approach.  For the neoclassical approach, copyright is 104
much more, as Netanal explains, “copyright is primarily a mechanism for market 
facilitation, for moving existing creative works to their highest socially valued uses.”  105
This logic helps to explain why the expansion of copyright is not merely more territory 
but the very means of accounting for what territory is. 
 Mark Lemley, “Book Review––Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property,” in Texas Law 101
Review (1997): 34.
 Lemley, “Book Review”, 35.102
 Neil Weinstock Netanel “Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society,” The Yale Law Journal 106/2 103
(1996): 283-367.
 Netanal, “Copyright and Democracy,” 309.104
 Netanal, “Copyright and Democracy,” 309.105
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Not only is there a huge increase in the number of things being claimed as property but 
also the power over that property is increasing. Wholesale attack on the public domain, 
to the idea that a work would ever belong to more than one person. Think of the 
absolute singularity of the album. The point here is similar, not to critic the idea (of 
which there are many) but that the idea of property bears the explanatory power far 
better than an eighteenth century romantic author can. This metaphor, property, is 
responsible for the destruction of the public domain into private property and serves to 
explain it better. But this metaphor is immanent within copyright in other ways as well. 
How can we make assessments? Lemley points out the key distinction nested in the 
dominant metaphors: “The import of romantic authorship theory is that the intellectual 
contributions of “authors” are overvalued, and the intellectual contributions of others 
are correspondingly undervalued. By contrast, the theory of propertization suggests that 
strong pressure exist to make sure that all valuable information is owned by someone, 
simply because it is valuable.”  106
A transformation within the background metaphorics amounts to a reconstruction of the 
relations of power and the attitude or comportment of its adherents. As Netanal writes, 
“the neoclassicist approach focuses less on the precarious balance between reader and 
writer than on perfecting markets for all potential uses of creative works for which there 
may be willing buyers.”  The absolute metaphor does not in this sense speak falsity, 107
nor is it capable of speaking truth. Rather, has Blumenberg notes, “absolute metaphors 
‘answer’ the supposedly naïve, in principle unanswerable questions whose relevance 
lies quite simply in the fact that they cannot be brushed aside, since we do not pose 
them ourselves but find them already posed in the ground of our existence.”  To this 108
end, the author is dead. The more recent turn to intellectual property accounts for a 
radical translation of authorial influence to literary property into property management 
such that literary property need hardly be seen in light of its literariness. What in the 
early eighteenth-century was a dubious proposal, “…it is just, that an author should reap 
 Lemley, “Book Review,” 50.106
 Netanal, “Copyright and Democracy,” 309.107
 Blumenberg, Paradigms for a Metaphorology, 14.108
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the pecuniary profits of his own ingenuity and labor,” has been replaced by a modern 
market fixation dependent on neoclassical economic notions of property and property-
owning subjects. The reoccupation of the authorial position by property has a 
predominately pragmatic value in testifying on behalf of those historical witnesses 
whose own testimony may lack such value. To tease out the effects of these 
subterranean shifts in the questions we do not ask, the ones we would never think to ask, 
guides the remainder of this chapter as I turn to the foregrounded rhetoric of the album 
Once Upon a Time in Shaolin. 
For it is only is identifying an orientation that we can begin to ascertain what 
fundamental “certainties, conjectures and judgments in relation to which attitudes and 
expectations, actions and inactions,” of an epoch, (the historical unit of measure for a 
dominant position) and how they are regulated.   Only in the fine print upon sale, after 109
they had, ‘spent months finalizing contracts and devising new legal protections for a 
distinctive work whose value depends on its singularity,” do the legal contours surface. 
To be fair, they may not be the most eye-catching or trendy aspect of the album, release 
or the record. But as I’ve argued earlier, their conspicuous absence during a ‘crisis of 
copyright’ deserves our attention. Copyright is there as the absolute metaphor, the 
horizon of possibility and the framework for understanding our approach to works of 
art. It’s absence then, is telling. But just what does it have to say?  
It is worth mentioning here that the study of rhetoric aims to investigate how and what 
is said to inform, persuade and motivate one’s audience. Following Aristotle, rhetoric 
typically provides heuristics for understanding, discovering and developing arguments 
for particular situations. Namely, practical and public matters. Aristotle makes the 
distinction between dialectic and rhetoric but notes how rhetoric is a ‘counterpart’ of 
dialectic, indeed, even resembles it. It seeks out ‘probable knowledge’ in an effort to 
defend or accuse. Not simply geared to elaborate or describe one’s thoughts, rhetoric 
formulates judgments, judgements that convince or not based on credibility and 
emotion, but succeed or fail on the weight of something other than sheer theoretical 
 Blumenberg, Paradigms for a Metaphorology, 14.109
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argumentation and facts. When looking at the press release, the website and related 
interviews surrounding the release of Once… this goes equally for what is not said. An 
academic study of copyright must account for the dialectic and the rhetoric of copyright. 
Given the fact that dialectics, in the sense of a real question and answer between right’s 
holders, the users of content and the government, is virtually absent, rhetoric must be 
accounted for. This unilateral nature of copyright discourse, as discourse in effect, is all 
the more reason to draw questions from given answers. 
The need to understand the rhetoric of copyright is hardly a new approach.  Scholars 110
have noted the historical arrival of new metaphors for understanding technological 
development and a slew of problems digital media have produced, moral arguments 
against ‘pirates’, right’s holders and questions of the materiality of intellectual property 
and not the mention the contentious concept of the author, have all been challenged and 
debated. Work by Steward E. Sterk has noted a certain stagnant character to the rhetoric 
surrounding copyright and the unfortunate fact that “the rhetoric captures only a small 
slice of contemporary copyright reality.”  This is, in part, why the background 111
metaphorics of copyright is valuable. As I mentioned earlier, the emphasis on property 
is the only the other side of the coin of piracy.  Vaidhyanathan has gone so far as to 112
suggest that “All along, the author was deployed as a straw man in the debate. The 
unrewarded authorial genius was used as a rhetorical distraction that appealed to 
American romantic individualism,” one predicated on the accumulation of property.  113
The rhetorical ploy should be old hat, and while Vaidyanathan’s consternation towards 
its effective end is shared by this author, the ‘property right’ as the general public now 
 The work by scholars such as Larson, Lessig, Vaidhanathan, Patry, Jaszi and Woodmansee, to name a 110
few, prefigure and ground approaches to understanding the vagaries of the language composing 
copyright regimes. 
  Stewart E. Sterk, “Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law,” Michigan Law Review 94/5 (1996): 1197.111
 This is to a large extent because whenever we approach the conceptual totality that we call copyright 112
in contemporary times, the question of copyright has already been posed for us. The fact that 
copyright is in a state of crisis is a testament to this fact. This structures our approach and it 
conditions our response.
 Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 11.113
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understands copyright obfuscates any attempt to argue on behalf of any original 
intention at all.  114
Once Upon a time…Property
The high-res website fronting the Once Upon a Time in Shaolin release greets its 
audience with a cool minimal grey. Clicking on the Latin heading, CONCEPTUS, 
(drawing on the term and moment of conception, intended to trigger a reflection on our 
own personal absent fortuitous beginnings, or more commonly the early stages of the 
embryo), the website in emboldened red capitals declares: "SINCE TIME 
IMMEMORIAL". A minor deviation from the more common English phrase "from time 
immemorial". Such subtleties of phrasing are the fruits of rhetoric, the very proof of its 
efficacy. Time immemorial, of course, refers to a time extending beyond the realm of 
memory, record or tradition. A turn of phrase whose meaning has an interesting and 
pertinent locutionary deviation in application such that recollections of times bygone 
more generally can be thrown beyond the horizon of remembrance for generally 
innocuous, albeit exaggerated, rhetorical effect while the phrase takes on a highly 
specific implication in reference to a property or benefit such that a 'property or benefit 
has been enjoyed for so long that they no longer need to prove how they came to own 
it.' Time immemorial becomes time out of mind, "a time before legal history and beyond 
legal memory' according to the 18
th
 century treatise by Sir William Blackstone (1765) 
Commentary Iviii 281. The influence of Blackstone's thought on English law is 
uncontested and as such, the effect of Blackstone's thought on the American legal 
system is similarly great. Such a defining text as Blackstone's commentaries served to 
provide a readable justification for what was then seen as obscure– that English law was 
indeed rational, just and inevitable that things should be as they are.' 
 “It was originally a narrow federal policy that granted a limited trade monopoly in exchange for 114
universal use and access,” (Vaidynathan, 2003, 11).
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The turn of phrase however, has relevant ramifications to the present study when used in 
relation to property, the benefits it endows and relations it assumes. Authors like 
Shaunnagh Dorsett and Lorraine Weir have written about the development of English 
common law and the place of “time immemorial” in its institution. The pluralistic, 
fragmented and decentralized nature of English law was becoming unwieldy until legal 
reform sought to bring the bric-a-brac system into the 'law of the land'. Dorsett writes 
that English common law “is still often described as owning its validity and continuing 
force to its origins in 'time out of mind'…[and the] concept of 'time immemorial' 
remains doctrinally central to parts of the common law, notably to the validity and 
enforceability of local custom."  The fact that the law remains rooted in a particular 115
sense of 'having always done it this way' is perhaps less astonishing than some of its 
consequences. The flippancy of the phrase suggests that at a certain point memory, 
record and tradition no longer count, are no longer valid. It’s not that people don’t have 
memories or haven’t heard account, it’s that those memories and those accounts no 
longer count. So it was in 1275 in the Statue of Westminster effectively limiting the time 
of memory to the reign of Richard I (Richard the Lionheart) beginning legal history and 
legal memory on the 6
th
 of July 1189, the date of the King's accession to the throne. 
That property and benefit need not be legitimated, or rather, that they are legitimated 
because they have been enjoyed hitherto should rind a loud siren in the head of anyone 
who claims such essential values from time immemorial. The mundane origins of the 
Wu-Tang project, Once Upon a Time in Shaolin, draw upon a mythical past, not of 
valiant heroes who overthrew their ruthless oppressors but of the inception of legal 
order. As if to say, for those who have managed to accrue land now, it matters not when 
or by what means, but from here on out it is yours by virtue of your claim. The position 
of property here not only attempts to ground Once Upon a Time in Shaolin, but to 
reinterpret all art under the same category. 
 Shannagh Dorsett “‘Since Time Immemorial’: A Story Of Common Law Jurisdiction, Native Title And 115
The Case Of Tanistry" (Melbourne University Law Review: 2002) 38. See also Lorraine Weir’s 
““Time Immemorial” and Indigenous Rights: A Genealogy and Three Case Studies (Calder, Van der 
Peet, Tsilhqot'in) from British Columbia” (Journal of Historical Sociology: 2013).
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The press release for Once Upon a Time… notes that, “By adopting an approach to 
music that traces its lineage back through The Enlightenment, the Baroque and the 
Renaissance, we hope to reawaken age old perceptions of music as truly monumental 
art.”  Reference to these ‘golden eras’ of musical history elides any account the horrid 116
conditions of artists, not to mention the terrible social conditions of people more 
generally, and works to identify the artist with the absolute power associated with 
benefactors and patrons.  A kind of historical cherry-picking ensures. By ignoring the 117
historical fact that the nature of making and experiencing art has changed since the 
seventeenth century Once… removes the question of music from conditions of 
production in exchange for focusing on the conditions of consumption. It is from this 
point of view that art is ultimately experienced and praised, that originality is 
acknowledged and appreciated and the European disposition to view culture like 
Americans view economics, as a trickle down effect of ‘high’ culture to the ‘lower’ 
masses proves its value and its worth. The closing lines of the press release are the nail 
in the coffin: “We hope to steer those debates toward more radical solutions and 
provoke questions about the value and perception of music as a work of art in today’s 
world.” 
Property exists in time and space, much like the proprietor who may call it theirs. The 
title Once Upon a Time in Shaolin refers to some golden days, the days of yore and 
myth. The standard introduction of a bedtime story both exploits the fantastical and 
reflects on their past. There are cameos and sounds from members of the Wu-Tang who 
have passed, references to times long gone. Secondly, the reference to Shaolin is a 
continuation of the Wu-Tang’s tendency to reference tv martial arts and the Shaolin 
temple in China. Shaolin was the slang they developed for Staten Island. Thirdly, in 
thinking about the album, the RZA, writes, “Only one man can hold the scepter.”  The 118
pharaoh in this context is not an abstract reference but the absolute ruler of a kingdom, 
over a realm, the pharaoh is the regime. Sterk has noted, “creative people define 
 Press Release, see Appendix.116
 The work was created, after all, absent any patron and therefore demonstrates the prestige of the 117
author-patron, a new model of artist cable of investing in themselves.
 Press Release, see Appendix.118
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themselves by reference to their work and giving them control over their work is 
essential in order to protect their self-conceptions.”  That financial rewards allow 119
authors to maintain a sense of identity has been documented throughout copyright 
literature, most commonly tracing back to Hegel and his theories on property as 
personality personified.  This line of thinking forms the basis of a mutual recognition 120
both artists and audience independently will. If works were treated as public goods, the 
logic goes, recognition would be one-sided, the audience appreciating the artist but the 
artist unable to recognize their admirers. While the emphasis on mutual recognition, 
particularly on behalf of the artist towards their admirers hardly seems to be the 
common reference point, the reference to a unique scepter Once… makes overt 
reference to the identity of an artist and their creative domain to be wrapped up in 
whatever transaction consecrated the sale of the album. Just as for Hegel, property 
rights served as a touch stone in their actual existence between equal actors and less so 
any substantial content. “Because property is about relations, not about objects,” as 
Sterk notes, “the precise contours of legal doctrine are unimportant so long as property 
law enables people to engage in intersubjective relations.”  The necessity for equal 121
grounding in contractual relations, can be traced back to this logic as well. It is worth 
stressing here two main points: the first is that considerations of copyright that reject the 
notion of equal parties (most notably the absence of diminution of the public voice) 
ultimately amount to right’s holders aims to legitimate their own identities as the 
expense of their audience, the resultant relationship being uneven and philosophically 
less gratifying. How might a lesser audience even truly value the work of a greater 
artist? Secondly, Hegel’s logic, being dialectical rather than essential, precludes the 
necessity of rights in any strict sense as such rights need not have any particular content 
 Stewart E. Sterk, “Rhetoric in Copyright,” 1239.119
 Stewart E. Sterk, “Rhetoric in Copyright,” 1240. Hegel’s attempt to get at the reality of human life led 120
him to believe that an abstract human remained abstract until distinguishing characteristics could be 
ascertained and the unique individual would be recognizable from an abstract mass. Property was one 
powerful way to do this. By occupying some space, through compulsion, wealth or work, one’s 
identity was differentiated.
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or form except that it allows for both the individuality of artist and audience to be 
mutually recognizable.  122
In this chapter I have argued that rhetorical tools have a certain ‘readiness to hand’ 
about them. They provide an insight into the existing expectations, attitudes and 
predispositions of arguments and positions. This is generally done through metaphors, 
authorship and property which serve to frame the possibility of imagining, and this is no 
different for issues of copyright, piracy, art, technology and value. Secondly, given that 
rhetoric is the means by which we build our environment as humans it will never cease 
to be both our poison and panacea. This realization allows us to bracket or suspend 
certain moral arguments and hazard imagining alternatives to copyright. Like copyright, 
rhetoric, we do not make use of it ‘because of a transcendent ‘surplus’ that [we] possess 
but because of an immanent deficiency, a deficiency of pre-given, prepared structures to 
fit into and of regulatory processes for a connected system.”  Copyright is there to 123
insure that certain processes are there to regulate and ensure the possibility of creativity, 
not to reward it, praise it, or guarantee it. Creativity is ultimately action, one that must 
occur inspire of not knowing what might happen. Indeed, it is such creativity that we 
most value. Copyright is a kind of harmony of contradictions and as such it has been 
mere noise for some and brilliant sounds for others. These contradicting interests are 
made apparent through metaphors and the assemblages of concepts that compose the 
world of copyright.  124
I have charted the extent of copyright rhetoric and its proprietary conclusions. An 
analysis of Once Upon a Time in Shaolin suggests that the exclusive legal a priori of 
copyright grounds the projects property based language and logic. This logic is intended 
to redirect thoughts through the moral arguments of right’s holders and towards 
 Not the mention such logic hardly begins to explain the need for post-mortem rights.122
 Hans Blumenberg “An Anthropological Approach to Rhetoric,” in After Philosophy: End or 123
Transformation?, edited by Kenneth Baynes, James Bohman, and Thomas McCarthy, translated by 
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other,” (Attali 1985, 5).
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ownership which is the solution to the tragedy of the commons. This line of reasoning is 
radically against the public interest. Furthermore, this same move is interestingly made 
by reference to the historic ‘golden ages of music’ and the concerns of ‘high’ art. Both 
logics, although contradictory, aim to focus copyright on the distribution and 
consumption end of culture and away from the social conditions of creative production. 
This is in line with our idea of property, not in describing what it is, but in accumulating 
it. This was, in part, the result of technological innovations. These technological turns 
we now turn to in the following chapter 
As I have argued above, copyright is by no means what it must be, nor as it should be. 
In fact, copyright has undergone many transformations, ones identifiable within the 
historical contingency of various situations over time, in what we might terms ‘ages’ or 
‘epochs’. This kind of formulation allows us to approach the crisis as such, as some 
kind of break or rupture. Furthermore, this ‘rupture’ is not something for industry 
officials or lawyers to handle. It is not limited to a dialectic analysis but is intimately 
concerned with the rhetoric of the public. Not least because of the extensive litigation 
that has brought copyright into the homes of an astonishing amount of citizens but, as I 
will argue, because the extensive reach of copyright has come to effect the way we 
‘hear’. 
History demonstrates that great musicians such as Bach, Beethoven and Mozart were held in profoundly 
high esteem. They were considered sublime artists and masters of exploring emotion. Their work forged 
windows into the most elusive elements of the human experience. And yet in our time, music is no longer 
perceived in the same way.  125
How then should music be perceived? In that time it was the savant composer, now it is 
the one with the scepter. As I mentioned earlier, discussion over music is about what 
you hear only after you’ve established how to hear. 
 Press Release, see Appendix.125
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III. Re-formatting Copyright: 
The Material Conditions of 
Change
 The Wu-Tang Clan’s “ambitious project to restore both economic and experiential 
value to music” hinges on the slippery terminology of the singular value. They write in 
the Press Release, “As this was never about personal gain but about the essence of 
value,” they donated a “significant portion” to charity. Only later does the “historical 
sale” boomerang back “through the ages to remind us every now and then that music is 
a great art from that should be valued as such.”  In this case, value serves to rejoin, 126
perhaps to re-entangle, economy and experience together seamlessly, insinuating a 
prodigal one-of-a-kind bond between the two. A gap seemingly traversable only by 
copyright. This gap exists as a relation such that our common sentiment is not offended 
by economic influence on art nor art’s solicitous affair with economy. Such delicacies 
should not be taken as juvenile nor unrealistic, for the assumptions brought to art 
combined with the expectations heaped upon it from tradition, irregardless of whether 
or not art is beholden to them, confounds our judgments when tainted with the smell of 
money.  There can be no doubt that certain cultural products are set apart from other 127
out more base commodities, like sneakers or sweatpants. The divide between them, 
increasingly semipermeable as it may be, serves for making certain analytic distinctions. 
For the time being, I would like to suspend the most apparent question, as laid out by 
David Harvey: “how to reconcile this uniqueness with its commodity status,” and draw 
attention to the ‘unique work of art’ concept for a couple of pressing reasons.  
 Press Release, see Appendix.126
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The first is that while the ‘work of art’ for the Wu-Tang, appears to be very much a 
material thing, crafted, touched, malleable and increasingly analog, the press release, in 
no uncertain terms, puts the weight of the work’s novelty on “the historic sale” of Once 
Upon a Time in Shaolin and the “album’s intended distribution.”  Ironically enough, 128
it’s the means of letting go of the work that anchors the “challenge to the increasing 
disposability of music in the digital era.”  To adopt the aesthetic language for a 129
moment, it becomes increasing clear that the Wu-Tang are very interesting in the work 
of art, that is, what art does, or is capable of doing, at least as much as any particular 
work of art. In fact, I will argue Once Upon a Time in Shaolin was intended and, indeed, 
continues to do a very specific kind of work. And all this without the vast majority of 
people ever having to listen to it. Before venturing into what this kind of work is, a 
second point, built off of the former. If the album roots its “historic” capacities in how 
we access music, or more likely than not in this case, what our experience of not 
accessing it, what different kind of relations with music can we interpret from the one-
of-a-kind release? Put in terms of copyright, what tensions are brought to light when 
considering the material conditions of the singular non-distributed Once Upon a Time in 
Shaolin and in what ways do these belie the album’s position in cultural and legal 
propertization of music in the cultural imagination? A critical examination of the history 
between the intercepting realms of culture, technology and law can be a helpful in 
mobilizing alternative approaches to copyright. I hope to show that this approach opens 
up rich interpretations of a presently narrow conception of ‘material’ in copyright. 
What follows in this chapter lays out the framework for providing answers to the earlier 
questions and proceeds to investigate the material conditions of music and its relation to 
copyright broadly. I then articulate how these relations help to understand the 
peculiarity of the propertization of copyright in the digital era. This requires getting to 
know the ‘lay of the land’ by recourse to several of the major developments within 
notions of ‘property’, how it has transformed and the various ways copyright has 
developed in the past. An examination of the album Once Upon a Time in Shaolin 
 Press Release, see Appendix.128
 Press Release, see Appendix.129
!59
serves as the occasion to think through the specific materiality and media of the work, to 
see the relations that compose the extant crisis of copyright. The history that emerges 
from the real material conditions of production and reception of this musical work and 
not a specific law, innovation, or point in time aims to be both evidentiary of 
propertization and causal in thinking about alternatives. In this sense, the “prevalence of 
a specific condition of things” guides the methodology, proscribing certain logical 
consequences while imagining others.  130
Material Labor and Theories of Property
The transition to a metaphorics of property positions property as the dominant trope for 
understanding the relations comprising copyright. I have argued that previous accounts 
considering transformations within copyright tend to suffer from the fact that attention 
gravitates towards the discrete subjects and objects involved in the production process, 
the author and the work. This emphasis on the subject and object suffers from an 
inherent failure to account for copyright laws’ internal transformations historically and 
more recently, is hardly reflected in copyright law. Nonetheless, arguments critical of 
copyright expansion are launched from the position of the subject, only they tend to plot 
the audience as the true subject and master of the copyright regime narrative. That 
“Romantic determinism”, as Anne Barron has labeled it, has largely not been 
responsible for copyright’s transformations has not stopped it from being the dominant 
metaphor for thinking about copyright.  This proclivity to speak on behalf of the 131
author is now largely an effect passed down through tradition and adopted as dogma; 
but in the eyes of capital, and increasingly the law, it serves as a profitable and 
exploitable distraction. As I argued above, property was a valuable ally in founding (and 
funding) the fledgling professional author and allowed her to establish more control 
over the conditions and means of production. It is the pressing reality of the economic 
limitations of authors that takes center stage in A Room of One’s Own, in which Virginia 
Wolf writes, “[o]ne cannot think well, love well, sleep well, if not has not dined 
 Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, 461.130
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well.”  While the problem of authorial penury was not limited to England, (nor to 132
women, although they were no doubt worse off then their male counterparts), the 
particular form it took in the English speaking world came from the English 
philosopher, John Locke.  
Based in his Second Treatise on Government, Locke’s labor theory of property, based in 
natural law, held that the origins of property are rooted in the exertion of labor upon 
natural resources. Drawing from the Bible, Locke claimed that god had given the world 
to all of humanity: 
 “...since He gave it them for their benefit and the greatest conveniences of life they 
were capable to get from it, he can’t have meant it should always remain common and 
uncultivated. He gave it for the use of the reasonable and hard-working man (and labour 
was to be his title to it)...”   133
With its publication in 1690, the Second Treatise quickly became the dominant 
reference for literary-property arguments in court. While Mark Rose has argued for that 
copyright is a “specifically modern institution,” the amalgamation of technology, 
ideologies of unique individuality, and advanced marketplace society. The contentious 
but popular idea that “[c]opyright is founded on the concept of the unique individual 
who creates something original and is entitled to reap a profit from those labors,” is the 
fortuitous product of centuries of contingent and, at times, competing interests.  The 134
Lockean labor theory of property seemed to be able to unite the technological, 
economic, political and aesthetic interests by identifying the social order’s principal 
function as defender of private property and the author as prime laborer, the genius 
appropriator, of a property immaterial but no less real. If we stand back and 
acknowledge the dramatic transformation of a landed gentry prior to copyright to the 
contemporary corporate conglomerate proprietor of “intangible properties” or 
“intellectual property”, the relationship between society and property has followed a 
fairly steady trajectory with the introduction of Locke’s labor theory of property. This is 
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remarkable. The path, beginning in the ashes of feudalism and continuing for over three 
centuries until the radically parallel digital worlds of wireless online gaming, has largely 
resulted in the reproduction of conventional property relations.  The main distinction I 135
want to make here is that while property has changed, a point I will address in more 
detail shortly, the reproduction of property relations has not. Is there something about 
Locke’s labor theory of property, his theory of appropriation, that might account for 
this?  
The implicit assumption to Locke’s theory is the plentitude of the world, hence the 
Lockean proviso that one can take from the land of plenty as long as one leaves 1) 
‘enough’ and 2) ‘as good’ resources for others: in Locke’s wording, “he that leaves as 
much as another can make sure of does as good as take nothing at all.”  While this 136
golden age plenitude serves as the basis for understanding copyright logic it appears 
today as the “superficial streaming and data conception” of the internet, precisely what 
the Wu-Tang Clan’s album stands to contest. The “convenient consumerism” such 
plenitude provides results in the passive denigration of music as art.  In response, the 137
single one of a kind album aims to stand out and redirect attention to the value of the 
single unique work of art. Such a pivot exposes contradictions within the theory in its 
modern day context. Latent in Locke’s theory is the general rejection of taking from 
others, but his theory advances along a line of appropriation, not simply allowing, but 
even encouraging accumulation.  In the Human Condition, Hannah Arendt notes, 138
“[w]hat the modern age so heatedly defended was never property as such by the 
 X has argued in “Solomon’s Bluff” in Modernism and Copyright, “The idea that the advent of virtual 135
worlds is producing in contemporary society a significantly new kind of relationship between 
property and the cultural imagination; and, second, a sense of the degree to which the innovative 
potential of this new form has largely been ignored in favor of the reproduction of the most 
conventional forms of poverty relations.” 
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unhampered pursuit of more property or of appropriation.”  In the case of intellectual 139
property, it could be fashioned from nothing and otherwise, taken from somewhere or 
purchased from someone else. “No doubt, “before 1690 no one understood that a man 
had a natural right to property created by his labour; after 1690 the idea cam to be an 
axiom of social science.”  This radical transition sheds light on the relations between 140
ideas of property and relations of property. For Arendt, the unification of labor and 
property amounted to a revolutionary union of opposites: labor originally being the 
activity corresponding to poverty and property being the condition of wealth. Labor was 
never understood as the means to wealth, rather, “according to Cicero––and he probably 
only sums up contemporary opinion––property comes about either through ancient 
conquest or victory or legal division.”  Indeed, Law Professor Stewart Sterk has noted 141
the important economic function of Lockean labor/property theory when he argues that 
in suggesting people are entitled to their own labor “it encourages people to work in a 
way that they might not if labor were treated as part of a common pool of societal 
resources.”  Thus, effectively resolving the pressing dispute by avoiding the ‘tragedy 142
of the commons’ and foregrounding the economic advantages of a the theory itself. The 
questions therefore arises, as Sterk points out, whether the Lockean theory would be so 
compelling were it not for the economic advantages such regime generates, a point 
digital economies has brought to the fore and I will take up in more detail in the 
following chapter.  It is enough here to lay out some of the tensions and similarities 143
between the dominant labor theory of property advanced in the eighteenth-century and 
our twenty-first century understanding of artistic and cultural production. 
That this theory “won the day” appears self-evident from the view of post-Soviet 
neoliberal global economy in 2016, but it was actually far more contested for thinkers 
knee-deep in the national democratic fury of the eighteenth-century. There were 
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alternatives to the way of thinking we currently claim to be the norm even then. 
Scholars like Hobbes and Hume argued that property only arises after society is 
established with a Sovereign, or the State. Property was understood to be the basis of 
individuals distinguishing themselves within a collective society, as the means for 
forming relations with one another as opposed to Locke’s notion that persons were 
already, indeed naturally, individualized. Property was first and foremost, property of 
oneself and had no basis on conventions or politics, but came straight from god. The 
notion of owning yourself deserves a quick comment. For Hume, and later for Hegel, 
ideas of personality were tied to social equality and not to financial equity. They 
understood that creative people defined themselves by reference to their work––
property was seen to be the means by which personality was objectified.  The need for 144
such objectification was due to the abstract nature of personality itself. Property allowed 
abstract individuals to acquire external affects, much like talents and traits for the sake 
of becoming recognizable. It was this recognition that stood as the basis of a possibility 
of mutual exchange between creators of goods and their admirers. Hegel’s notion of 
mutual exchange does fall in line with much of intellectual property law but only as 
sufficient grounds for focusing on the intersubjective relations, and not the objects, 
whereas, modern day intellectual property law goes above and beyond that in defining 
what kind of relationships are available. Sterk writes, “Intellectual property rights, 
although entirely consistent with Hegel’s conception of property, are not strictly 
necessary. Perforce, intellectual property rights need not have any particular content of 
form.”  Moreover, since 1909 musicians have had little say over where their music 145
could be performed. With the implementation of compulsory licenses for mechanical 
reproductions of music in 1909 and the subsequent and necessary formation of ASCAP 
in 1914, musicians were left to try and collect their revenues themselves for five years 
or pay a fee to get them. Mutual exchange was rendered an economic insufficiency and 
done away with.  Furthermore, following the Copyright Act of 1976 an increasingly 146
number of creative works have been done as ‘works for hire’, a unique exception to the 
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general rule that the person who created the work is not legally recognized as the author 
of that work. In other countries, this is understood as ‘corporate authorship’ as the 
employer, be it corporation, organization, individual or any other legal entity is the legal 
author.  This is different than signing over, or “transferring” copyright, like musicians 147
or authors do to publishers because the author, retains those copyrights not granted to 
the publisher where as works made for hire, in all their entirety, belong to the employer 
unless otherwise agreed. 
The purpose of this small historical tangent into property theories and their legal 
correlates aims to see through the contradictions and justifications of the current 
maldistribution and exploitation of intellectual property to a possible, more egalitarian, 
future. While ownership frames relationships to property and therefore, to music, I 
argue those relationships have always been about the relationships between people, and 
not between people and things. Thus, a critique of the propertization of copyright 
identifies at once, copyright’s “more fundamental commitment to the logic of property” 
while arguing that changing conceptions of property plays a part in sustaining the status 
quo of property relations. That is, an examination of the transformations of property 
amongst stable property relations allow us to approach propertization anew. With the 
continuous accumulation of property by the ruling class stable, an inquiry into just what 
counts as property, and by what means the seemingly endless amount of ‘scarce’ 
property available to capture guides the next step in the present analysis before turning 
to how these new properties help sustain and strengthen property relations in the music 
industries. 
Material, Media and Music
According to scholar, Anne Baron, because “Romantic determinism” is responsible for 
the tendency to overlook the ways in which the protected work is legally defined in 
terms of the author. What is needed then, is a turn to a “Modernist materiality”, which 
 This is in large part a uniquely American amendment. Moral right, being those rights that guarantee 147
actual creators the right to publicly identify themselves as such and to maintain integrity of their work 
are thus excluded from copyrights according to the Berne Convention. Microsoft is the credited 
developer of its products where as Adobe lists many of its developers behind Photoshop.
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aims to show how the “object” of Modernist art is reflected in copyright law.  While 148
an in-depth investigation into the proposed intersection between copyright, art and art 
theory is beyond the scope of the present argument there are several points I would like 
to open up and pursue in relation to Barron’s work. I will briefly comment on the 
tendency to ground ideas in their respective historical or aesthetic epochs before 
engaging the effects of the Modernist material impulse to investigate how immaterial or 
intangible works have posed complications for copyright law in the past and how those 
might differ in the digital age. Lastly, I will then turn to the materiality of sound itself 
and its correlation to changes in copyright law. 
Planting ideas in their respective historical or aesthetic epochs works as a kind of 
cultural and philosophical short hand for avoiding the need to qualify all kinds of 
competing social, economic and political baggage involved in the discussion of ideas. It 
also serves to locate the origin of an idea in a ‘fruitful time’, that needn’t account for its 
germination. The tendency to slip into speaking of the past in terms the past itself 
created is a persistent problem for the historian. To speak in terms of a period of time on 
the one hand and a set of distinctive beliefs, norms, themes on the others means 
balancing the material conditions of the latter with the technological possibilities of the 
former. In discussing the universalizing idea of “Art” as a “trend towards imaging art, 
with a capital A, as a “system” of the five major arts––painting, sculpture, architecture 
music and poetry––unified as a distinct arena of human activity under common 
principles suppled by the philosophical discourse of aesthetics,” Barron, citing 
Kristeller, dates the emergence of this attitude in the eighteenth century.  So when the 149
Wu-Tang Clan declare that “[b]y adopting an approach to music that traces its lineage 
back through The Enlightenment, the Baroque and the Renaissance, we hope to 
reawaken age old perceptions of music as truly monumental art,” be have to ask what 
history is being referring to, that is, what is fruitful about those eras?  If the 150
 Baron, “Copyright Law and the Claims of Art”, 370.148
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“monumental art” referred to is not “Art” in the sense Barron and others have argued 
dates back to the Romanic era, what conception of art is it and when could it be said to 
have been possible? Arguably, the historical references to “monumental art” are mere 
low hanging fruit––on the one hand a flourish, an aggrandizing gesture aimed at 
distancing the work from its present context of mass-production, but on the other hand, 
the gesture belies attempts to tie each of the era’s greatest revolutionary achievements 
and successes into the work’s complex and competing messages. First off, the 
Enlightenment is hardly cited as being a popular or convincing adjective when 
discussing music, particularly as it lived in the shadow of the Romanticism. The 
Enlightenment is nevertheless, a moving point everyone seems to agree upon.  
Renaissance music, in a similar fashion, is not the medium typically referenced when 
describing the truly revolutionary overthrow of institutional control in the arts.  151
Nevertheless, the album intends to garner just that effect. I mention this historical 
tendency briefly not because both scholars and rap stars make recourse to positioning 
arguments in epochs but because I want to draw attention to the ways Once Upon a 
Time in Shaolin suggests, at times obvious, and others oblique references to changing 
social orders. When considering music in each of these historical epochs the mutations 
reveal the changing ways in which people were accessing music, rather than how 
musical structures or sounds proved revolutionary. The limitations on how music could 
be experienced are only even the definitions of describing the experience. These 
references work towards reframing the Wu-Tang Clan’s attempt to change the 
perception of music––obvious or oblivious as they may be. 
To return to the emphasis on materiality in the Modernist impulse, following the work 
of W. Ron Gard and Elizabeth Townsend Gard I would like to reposition the modernist 
impulse from the relegated realm of superstructure, to firmly in the base. In doing so I 
ask, what is modernist about the means and conditions of production of Once Upon a 
Time in Shaolin and what can it tell us about the larger crisis of copyright? Drawing 
upon the modernist ‘narrative of crisis’ I follow a line of thought on the material level, 
an approach described by Gard and Gard as being attentive to the “volatile, critical state 
 It was the ‘traditionalist” Italian music form, Opera, that is most often cited, despite being most often 151
positioned only at the end of the Renaissance and the beginning of the Baroque period.
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of the economic core and its self presentations.”  This line of thinking sees the 152
modernism of the law––its being-in-crisis––as the focal point, regardless of the 
modernity of a given work. This thought runs parallel to Barron who see’s the 
materiality of Modernist art reflected in copyright law because “copyright assumes ‘Art’ 
manifests itself only in a determinate array of species,” thereby discriminating and 
excluding many potential works.  In other words, the law’s discriminatory practice 153
surrounding what receives and does not receive protection allows an examination of the 
inherent biases of copyright and its treatment of works of art. Thus, whereas Barron 
argues that Modernist aesthetics are reflected in the law because of its focus on material 
and medium, Gard and Gard argue the modernism of the law is itself grounded on 
responding to a materialization of culture. To suggest copyright both effects and is 
effected by the works it protects or doesn't seems intuitive enough, what is of real 
interest is how and why. 
Barron provides a broader more theoretical argument. She sees copyright law’s deep 
commitment to property has the guiding logic for a view of art much older than 
Romanticism, where “separate arts are distinguished from each other, and the essential 
components of each art carefully dissected, for the purpose of identifying their aesthetic 
limits and possibilities.”  Gard and Gard, on the other hand, locate a turning point 154
early on in the twentieth-century with the affirmation of the Copyright Act of 1909. 
They note that while “copyright protects the expressive dimension of a “work” rather 
than its material embodiment as an object’ nonetheless, the broadening of the expressive 
aspects considered eligible for protection conferred both a new legitimacy and new 
secure on industrial objets with copyrightable elements.”  Technological innovations 155
in sound recording and mass industrialization taking place on a global scale produced a 
sensation that the vastly larger number of objects eligible for copyright were, in the eyes 
of copyright, insufficiency protected. This more generous open-door policy introduced a 
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‘materialization of culture’ that hardly went unnoticed, while trying to accommodate for 
a media revolution and the simultaneously perceived steady ‘dematerialization’ of 
culture into forms like radio, film and (later) TV. The difficulty of grappling with this 
dematerialization of culture produced grievances that ultimately produced the copyright 
revisions on 1976, and, I argue, persists to this day.  Indeed, concern about the 156
dematerialization of culture at the turn of the century seems hardly foreign to our 
contemporary palette. What was concern over analog objects has turned to anxiety over 
“digital exchanges.” Drawing from Once Upon A Time… it is not a concern over the 
content so much as it was the means of access: 
“The complacency of no holds barred access and the saturation wrought by technology’s 
erosion of challenges.  Mass replication has fundamentally changed the way we view a 
piece of recorded music, while digital universality and vanishing physicality have 
broken our emotional bond with a piece of music as an artwork and a deeply personal 
treasure.”  157
The tendency to blame technology for poisoning the cultural well in music is hardly 
new, however; whether it was the piano-player, the LP, the radio, the television, the 
cassette, the CD or the MP3, each format has taken the media beyond the prior’s 
limitations. It did so in ways that challenged and shaped what sounds could be produced 
and recorded, and how they could be enjoyed. Not all of these resulted in the 
dematerialization of culture though. In fact, it is important to note that intangibility and 
invisibility are not synonymous with immateriality. Examples from a history of sound 
recording technologies like the piano-player and the LP, testify to the one novelty of 
materialized music, while later developments like the Compact Disk (CD) and even the 
MP3 argue for reconsidering how digitalization produced a new kind of materiality.  It 
is to the shape of this materiality, those various instances within the changing 
materiality of a given medium, what I will call format, that I turn to next. 
 The 1976 Copyright Act stated that the work received federal protection the very moment it was “fixed 156
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At the beginning of Friedrich Kittler’s groundbreaking work Gramophone Film 
Typewriter, he writes “Media determine our situation, which–in spite or because of it–
deserves a description.”  What is beyond a doubt, as the Translator’s Introduction 158
notes, is their influence on how we appreciate them. Our present media determine how 
we think and talk about media of the past as much as they shape our thinking about 
media of future. Media are not innocent or neutral structures, technological systems or 
modes of communication. Authors as diverse as Friedrich Kittler, Marshall McLuhan, 
Jean Baudrillard and Paul Virilio have all written on the ideological impact of media on 
communication and subjectivity. It is common for these authors, Kittler included, to 
place media in historical epochs and to argue how each medium (clay, papyrus, paper, 
circuitry, fiber optics) “in turn tends to create its unique monopoly of knowledge.”  159
Kittler’s approach drawn from Foucault’s, is to seek out the means of accounting for 
and store knowledge. It is in light of this history that computerization and digitalization 
tend to strike scholars are the beckoning in of less a radically new technological era than 
one of communication. The changing modes of creating and storing information made 
possible by new technologies shatter the monopoly previous mediums held over 
knowledge and the imagination under the previous regime of information transfer. 
While it is not within the bounds of the present inquiry to undertake and in-depth 
analysis of whether or not “media technologies define our horizons of knowledge,” or 
challenge if we can in fact “reason only as far as the information machines of our time 
(our ‘technological a priori’) grant us, but to draw attention to the inherent 
complications in talking about media and their content overtime. In doing so we 
problematize the language for describing those processes once familiar but in 
contemporary technological frameworks suddenly vastly other. For it is just this 
difficulty that more recent discussions of the technological impact on copyright often 
over look. To account for the ‘new normal’ we must take stock of the past as a totality, 
and not merely its morality. Peter Decherney, writing on early copyright problems in 
cinema observes, “truths about motion pictures that seem obvious and inevitable in 
 Friedrich A. Kittler, Gramophone Film Typewriter, trans. Geoffrey Winthrop-Young and Michael Wutz 158
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hindsight took decades to identify and fix,” and goes on to suggest how answers to 
questions put forward throughout history “grew out of philosophical questions about 
how to shape the future or art, business, and society through new media.”  In one way 160
this is refining the argument advanced early about the back-and-forth of copyright law 
and the materiality of the works it aims to protect, but what media studies serves to 
identify and what art history is less inclined to, is shifting the emphasis of older models 
of communication from the content or the messages to “their very circuits, the very 
schematism of perceptibility.”  161
At this point, it is worth recalling that while most descriptions of the extant crisis of 
copyright oscillate between appeals to authorial (or right holder) rewards and their 
‘natural’ (in economic terms) response to changes in technology. In this model, media 
are introduced only to stress how technology exacerbates the otherwise, normal 
situation. There is a tendency to end critical investigation there because, as media theory 
Joseph Vogl has argued: “Media make things readable, audible, visible, perceptible, but 
in doing so they also have a tendency to erase themselves and their constitutive sensory 
function, making themselves imperceptible and “anesthetic.”  While this may help to 162
account for the fact that “certain actions cannot be attributed to a person; and yet, they 
are somehow still performed,” such as the questions of “piracy” when someone 
downloads and thereby reproduces a digital file online––an argument advanced by 
media theorists that aims to clarify how “that situation is reflected by the medium”––we 
need to grasp the significance of particular material instances across media and how 
changes in media reflect larger social, aesthetic, political and economic forces.  163
Claims about an invaded past don’t stand up to close analysis. And a critical 
examination of the various changing conditions of sound technology and its relation to 
music should. And all the more so if the goal is to identify just what is being protected 
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well into the future in the eyes of the law. As Johnathon Sterne has argued “[i]f your 
goal in designing a technology is to achieve some combination of channel efficiency 
and aesthetic experience, then the sensual and technical shape of your technology’s 
content is every bit as important as the medium itself.”  With this mind, I turn to 164
musical formats for an understanding of music’s materiality but insomuch as copyright 
is focused on the materiality of the works it aims to protect and promote an 
investigation into formats aims to explore the material relations of copyright as well.  165
In suggesting that the various instances in the changing materiality of music can be 
understood as format I am consciously engaging a history of discrete communication 
technologies and a genealogy of digital media culture.  Following Sterne, subjecting 166
digital history to a history of sound resolves several puzzles in the history of sound 
recording. The first issue amounts to reframing digital history, and a history of sound, in 
terms of a “general theory of compression.” The MP3 was not the first, and will 
certainly not be the last, new media to be more efficient and mobile, in terms of 
information and economy. While these developments begin “close to economic or 
technical considerations,” Sterne is quick to note that, “over time they take on a cultural 
life separate from their original, intended use.”  The second valuable asset to 167
understanding digital media within a history of sound is its capacity to point out the 
contingency and competing interests of digital technologies. Take for instance the 
problem of verisimilitude, a  longstanding puzzle for audiophiles and sound 
professionals, Sterne is quick to address. He defines the problem: In an age of ever-
increasing bandwidth and processing power, why is there also a proliferation of lower-
definition formats? If we have possibilities for great definition than ever before, why 
does so much audio appear to be moving in the opposite direction?”  Notions of 168
 Johnathon Sterne MP3:The Meaning of a Format, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012), 6.164
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progress tend to progress in only one way but it all hinges on how to measure progress. 
The typical account of progress in communication implies “a quest for definition, 
immersion, and richness of verisimilitude.”  This dream is exactly the one we see in 169
advertisements and marketing for sound equipment and other digital technologies. 
Without going into the technical distinctions between definition and its supposed 
correlation to reality, or audience preference for light distortion and alternation, it is 
enough here to point out how the progress-myth of recording technologies, particularly 
acute versions in the digital era, not only encourages fans to purchase the new format 
for its ‘superior sound’ when in fact, there may not be anything ‘better’ in terms of 
fidelity or correspondence to reality (it might even have startlingly less total sonic 
information like the MP3); but to shed light on various reasons why fans engage music 
in the first place and, perhaps more importantly, how the plethora of ways to experience 
music involve a complex matrix of technologies to account for them. Those critical 
dimensions of a format require codification, “something though policy, sometimes 
through technology’s construction, and sometimes through sedimented habit.”   170
This codification suggest that format theory applied to music requires working within 
the limited horizon of a particular musical format (and sonic media more generally) in 
relation to the multiple scales and time frames of media.  Sterne observes how a 171
critical study of format reveals its “articulation with particular practices, ways of doing 
things, institutions, and even in some cases belief systems,” within the general paradigm 
of storing and moving audio information.  Alternating between the particular and 172
larger totality acknowledges the changing conditions behind the storage and movement 
of audio across time and on various scales within various contexts. The dialectic 
involved between format and media engages those particular lived listening experiences 
of fans of music in a plurality of social, cultural and economic dimensions. In the case 
 Sterne, MP3, 4. He notes the common assumptions: “(1) that greater definition is the same thing as 169
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of format studies, this smaller register gives new insights to the generality; but more 
than simply reframing it, it has purchase on identifying the ideological inertia of sound. 
Looking “beneath, beyond and behind the boxes your media come in…invites us to ask 
after changing formations of media, the contexts of their reception, the conjectures that 
shaped their sensual characteristics, and the institutional politics in which they were 
enmeshed.”  Thus, format theory once again reminds us of the erroneous belief in the 173
neutrality of media, an idea McLuhan planted with “the media is the message” that was 
to be later radicalized by Baudrillard in “Requiem for the Media,” where he writes, 
media are “not coefficients but effectors of ideology.”  174
In contrast with media, in the case of format theory there is a certain level of specificity 
that one can point to when identifying the source of some ideological vector.  Sterne 
writes, “we may talk of media as being invented and developed, but the equivalent––
and much less spectacular––moment of birth for a format would have to be the moment 
it becomes a standard.”  With this in mind, when the Wu-Tang Clan write, “[p]erhaps 175
it is our cultural attitudes to modern music that have cast it as something to be 
consumed. The complacency of no holds barred access and the saturation wrought by 
technology’s erosion of challenges,” there arise a number of questions about what kind 
of cultural baggage ‘modern music’ in this context has and more to the point, just what 
kinds of ‘challenges’ they are referring to. While I will address this latter point at length 
in the next chapter, I want to now explore the former.  
Re-formatting Property
It seems clear that the Wu-Tang Clan have a vision of the world where culture attitudes 
have been shaped off beat with modern music’s technological developments. They paint 
an image where those developments made knowingly and willing by industry 
investment––manufacturing and marketing myths that intentionally pursued profit––are 
 Sterne, MP3, 11.173
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something bands were blindsided by, but fans were supposed to have see coming (or at 
least to have shown some self-control). For the purposes of this thesis, the problem 
ultimately hinges on the correlations and distortions the Once… model reflects in the 
actual present music practices. If music industry share holders, the primary right’s 
holders in the music world, have advocated with investment and marketing, or legal 
suppression, how might we understand the role of format and technological 
development in terms of industrial advantage? Advantage for such industries cannot be 
limited to terms of the bottom line. An understanding of modern day capital much raise 
the complexity of inquiry to problematize just what profits,, recommendations, 
shopping preferences, brand loyalty and other service oriented business practices are 
generating. Thus, would it be ridiculous to suggest that patterns between the correlations 
and disjunctures of our attitudes and various changes in format are reflected in 
copyright law as well? 
I would like to briefly take stock of the arguments up until this point. In the first part of 
this chapter I argued that an understanding of the material conditions of the author 
revealed the implicit arguments of authorship to be founded on Lockean labor theory. 
This theory, the basis for individualist freedoms and entitlements, was shown to be 
grounded in the maintenance of status quo labor relations. Because intellectual property 
laws do not produce sufficient incentive for much intellectual labor and intellectual 
property is itself abundant, there is no potential for the tragedy of the commons and 
Lockean logic fails to provide adequate grounds for privatizing intellectual property. 
The market logic glued on top of the Lockean moral arguments aims to equate market 
behavior with just reward, a deeply flawed logic that has nonetheless become the 
driving economic thought over the past centuries. Switching from the materiality of the 
author, in the second part, an investigation into the materiality of the ‘object’ protected 
by copyright revealed a similar trajectory. Following an approach to music from the 
position of format and recorded sound, the analysis cut a path across media, drawing out 
the cultural, social, political, economic, and technological contexts in which we, the 
audience, not only experience music but the means by which copyright law approaches 
it. Copyright law is innately dynamic. The promotion, distribution, and protection all 
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assume a changing and active context to justify its relevance, if not its existence. The 
question again arises: in what ways can an analysis of the materiality copyright, 
understood in terms of its object and whose materiality is understood in terms of format, 
reveal the tensions and contradictions of the present system and in particular, in the 
propertization of copyright? Turning to Once Upon a Time in Shaolin, I hope that by 
drawing upon these bold claims to draw out the obscure and stark tensions within the 
prevailing model. 
The radically of Once… is, in the words of the Wu-Tang Clan, “the first high-profile 
album never to be commercially released to the public and the first of its kind in the 
history of music.”  This imposed scarcity is the product of creative destruction. There 176
is, after all, nothing inherently limited about a digital product. The uniqueness of the 
work is, despite its fine arts wardrobe, not in the work itself. They write, “[t]he sole 
existing exemplar of Once Upon A Time In Shaolin, of which all backups and digital 
files have been destroyed,” confirming the inherent semiotic gray zone in “exemplar”. 
Exemplar, taken from the Latin exemplum, meaning ‘sample, imitation’ is one of those 
words whose meaning is deeply dependent on what it is being compared to and the 
context it is used in. It is either a typical example or an excellent model. There is a 
certain tongue-and-cheek involved in suggesting there is one digital replication to be 
prized above all others. The work itself has been destroyed, liquidated in favor of its 
more expensive copy. Only the ornate shell remains to invoke not only the ‘labor’ and 
the ‘object’ (the author and the work) but to grant it “its presence in time and space.”  177
Such “authenticity” is held out honestly, and in reactionary form. The one-of-a-kind 
album can be said to be “authentic” only in light of its history of abundance. The work 
is, at the end of the day, in CD format. There is something ironic about the choice. Not 
because the any household computer could copy the music or because it is the highest 
 Work, http://scluzay.com/work. (Accessed 14.10.2016). 176
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quality format available, despite being introduced in the 1980’s but because the CD’s 
emergence into the global economy marked the beginning of a revolution in music. 
The conception of the CD is largely credited to a meeting of the minds of Phillips (then 
known as Royal Philips Electronics) and Sony in 1979. The specifications of which 
could not be agreed upon, but the disk of 115 millimeters in diameter and 74 minutes of 
storage became the norm. The standard story behind this format is that a CD needed to 
be long enough to play Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony without interruption, hence 
exactly 74 minutes. This is, however, only one story of how the format came to be. 
Sterne demonstrates how engineers at Philips began discussing about the success of the 
cassette tape and how the compact disc should be about the same size because of the 
growing importance in transportability. Furthermore, given the technological 
capabilities available at the time Sterne argues that the CD format largely kept with 
leading interests in “isomorphism with other media” to maximize customer familiarity 
and communicability between existing media.  The importance of this narrative 178
should not go unnoticed. The story about Beethoven’s Ninth suggest the CD was the 
format for high culture, like all formats before it, arguing for a higher quality of sound 
that real musicians would appreciate. Additionally, it grounds the notion that “the 
primary referent of sound recording is live music,” and not other recordings.  179
Nonetheless, the record companies did not take to the new technology well. They would 
need to develop new packing, record shops would need to build new shops, customers 
would need to buy new devices and the record industries were already in a slump. As 
CD’s took off in the 1980’s the record industries began to see a steady rise in profits 
with people re-purchasing their entire collection. And in 1988, Sony purchased the 
largest record company in the world for two billion dollars, CBS records. Now 
solidifying its stake in the global economy, Sony had both the hardware and the 
software, the format and the content, and the music industry has never been the same.  
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The format of Once… brings the tensions behind the means and mannerisms of access 
to music the foreground. The self-imposed scarcity of the album is entirely manipulated 
and the ‘exemplar’ status plays with the idea of a digital original, the framing of the 
whole work argues for the audience to come and experience art on art’s terms. A 
tradition in music that aims to link recorded sound to live performance, a dubious 
contention as best.  It’s worth mentioning here the particular and reoccurring tendency 180
in the Once campaign to bring music back into the fold of the visual. As information has 
become more and more invisible, music, the original problem child has started to fill it 
out. The task of packaging sound has already been a tricky situation. But “sound 
recording set off conflicts over culture and property that profoundly shaped the course 
of copyright law in the twentieth century.”  Sayf Cummings has argued that 181
ultimately, “it introduced a kind of medium that could not be seen with the naked eye,” 
and that “all previous copyrightable works could be see, whether words on a page, 
musical notes, or the lines and colors of a photograph.”  The effect was not merely to 182
confound authors, audiences and lawmakers but it shook the basis of ownership. 
Different artists could all play the same track and each might play it differently, what 
was the original distinctive one? 
The conflation of music into the ream of visual art is hardly a naive or innocent gesture. 
As information supersedes the cases it was carried in, grounding the information in an 
object has been a common move within information industries. Apple software requires 
you to have an Apple product. Within music, Frank Oceans pop up store and magazine, 
Kanye’s Sculpture Famous and Jay-Z’s performance piece. I believe it amounts to an 
attempt to change the image of music, that is, how music is supposed to be seen. The 
perception of art. The RZA writes in the press release for the album, “Mass replication 
has fundamentally changed the way we view a piece of recorded music, while digital 
universality and vanishing physicality have broken our emotional bond with a piece of 
 Throughout the history of recorded sound music has changed focus from live performance to record 180
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music as an artwork and a deeply personal treasure.”  Much has been written about the 183
visual dominance of contemporary culture and while I do not currently have the time to 
do so, the tendency to conflate these mediums can be likened to the effects of 
intellectual property disputes. To ground it into a material is to make the issue of 
property more tangible. Recent pop-up releases by Frank Ocean, Kayne West’s 
sculptures, Jay-Z’s performance art pieces and Beyonce’s video-albums are all crossing 
boundaries. Indeed, it is an attempt to try and take difficulties and intricacies of 
copyright into a simpler, more concise form.  
There are correlations between Once Upon A Time in Shaolin and this historic moment 
in music history that go deeper than the CD but that are made visible only in light of it. 
Whether it is “technology’s erosion of challenges” or the “cultural attitudes to modern 
music” that stand in the way of music receiving its due in the Clan’s eyes, it is patently 
clear that music and the industry that supports it, is anything but the victim of some 
larger cultural coop. In fact, as I hope to have demonstrated music industries have 
through their own schemes of profit helped to create and sustain the culture of music as 
it currently is. A culture that is in large part, predicated on accumulation and 
disposability. While the Wu-Tang claim “only one man can hold the scepter,” I am 
arguing that a view of the object of music fails to account for the relations sustaining 
music. 
While music had previously been “owned”  in the form of a score, a form springing 
from a particular kind of music and that lent itself to belonging to a publisher or patron 
than the actual person who created it, it was with the advent of recorded music that the 
concern of its accumulation can be said to have become a concern. This accumulation of 
musical objects is the sensible result of a property logic grounded on the same basis as 
justifying the author’s recompense.  This self-same property logic would however, 184
have to endure history so that the reproduction and subsequent accumulation of sound 
 Press Release. See Appendix.183
 The various capacities of formats dramatically transformed approach to the medium. Recorded sound 184
was not used and manipulated by mere consumers; many a composer, most famously Stravinsky, 
would utilize the new technology to listen to their recordings and make corrections, foreshadowing a 
major industrial curveball with mixing and sampling.
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might become the necessary condition. In this sense, Lockean property logic reoccupied 
the justifications for the accumulation of property only after it had secured itself as 
legitimate grounds for guaranteeing such property in the first place. As the economic 
conditions advanced what accounted for property underwent a change but the relations 
to property did not. 
If we accept the argument that the background metaphorics of copyright have 
undergone a transformation from romantic author to property, and that that change has 
had an effect on the way we think about, deal with and what we expect from music then 
how can we account for these changes? In the previous chapter I argued that the 
locating copyright in terms of a property paradigm has explanatory power for 
transformations within copyright law throughout history, that it provides a compelling 
narrative for understanding the rhetorical trappings of music industries and business 
practices and provides insight into ‘property’ references within pop culture itself. These 
examples were drawn from US legal decisions, accounts of shifting models for 
capitalizing on music, in considerable part due to copyright, and specific references to 
the album Once Upon a Time in Shaolin. 
I hope to have demonstrated that the limited conceptions of materiality in thinking about 
copyright neglects to consider the relations of property at a high cost. Arguments based 
on the author and on the work equally serve to sustain property relations and references 
to technological disturbances clearly points to the inherent tension holding the structure 
together. A structure, I argue, predicated on propertization. By focusing on the material 
conditions determining the changing notions of author and object in the eyes of 
copyright law it becomes clear that throughout the past century copyright has 
transitioned from granting limited monopolies in the public interest to a model with 
recourse to accounting for creators and creations within the framework of accounting 
for capital. In accounting for the growing number of potential revenue sources (authors 
now working for hire) by the increasing number of objects available for copyright 
protection, industries have capitalized on their employees producing works in the 
company’s name. On the other hand, a look at the changing formats of recorded sound 
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reveals a tendency towards an increase in the quantity of properties without any 
correlation to an increase in quality. Customers purchase the same content on LP, 
cassette, CD and now MP3 not because the quality was radically better, but the 
conditions of listening to music, the situations of accessing it and the culture of 
engaging it have themselves undergone mutations that extend and ripple beyond the 
independent logic of a company but reflect the transforming logic of capital. Whether it 
is labeled real or landed property, literary property, or intellectual property, in each case, 
the property relations remain relatively stable while authors and audiences duke it out 
over the imposed scarcity of abundant goods. In other fields, scholars such as Eric 
Hayot and Edward Wesp have observed a similar contradiction: how do we account for 
the fact that “the advent of virtual worlds is producing in contemporary society a 
significantly new kind of relationship between property and the cultural imagination; 
and, second, a sense of the degree to which the innovative potential of this new form has 
largely been ignored in favor of the reproduction of the most conventional forms of 
property relations.” 
Put another way, a critique from a materialist perspective identifies the juncture of 
copyright and technology as hardly inimical, but, rather, as an ever present dimension of 
copyright’s expansion in accordance with the logic of propertization. Elaborating upon 
the drastic effects for both the public and future authors aline is unnecessary, it’s worth 
bearing in mind that the line of thought I am advancing sees the purported problem of 
technicalization as an inherent blinding at the expense of an elaboration of method.  185
Such a blinding, I have argued is the tendency to project the problem of technology such 
that desperate answers to ‘new questions’ can be provided. The framework I am 
proposing assumes that the crisis of copyright is one that requires reconsidering the 
conditions of such a crisis to account for the possibility of its coming into being, before 
proffering answers to resolving it. It is to this ‘blinding’ that I now turn. The economic 
dimension gives forms to logic of copyright and aims to demarcate the new territories 
the copyright regime has taken and intends through and by the means and logic of 
propertization. 
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!81
IV. Financing Musical 
Properties: Monopoly, 
Access and Speculation
The crisis of artistic reproduction which manifests itself in this way can be seen as an 
integral part of a crisis in perception itself…Insofar as art aims at the beautiful and, 
on however modest a scale, ‘reproduces’ it, it conjures it up (as Faust does Helen) out 
of the womb of time. This no longer happens in the case of technical reproduction. 
–Walter Benjamin  
On Some Motifs in Baudelaire 
Once Upon A Time in Shaolin presents a model for music that is utterly unsustainable. 
Six years of private funding, twenty years of hip-hop history and some hundred years of 
cumulative career credit to leverage behind the project are prerequisites prohibitively 
difficult to enter the market for most musicians. Neither the investment nor the 
distribution model are something anyone who qualifies as the ‘usual’ or ‘majority’ 
audience member could advocate. If, as they say, “[r]ecorded music is the work of art” 
then what can one make from the refusal to travel the traditional contours of recorded 
music?  Whatever the intended goal of the album is, it presents an alternative to 186
whatever we think the ‘traditional contours’ of a musical work to be, but perhaps what 
Once… is presenting is only the logical conclusion of the propertization of copyright. 
Understanding copyright in terms of propertization requires examining the correlations 
and tensions inherent to the contentious development of property its effects on both our 
thinking of  copyright law and the effects of our thinking, evidenced by vectored 
manifestations in legal transformation. As I argued in the previous chapter, 
distinguishing between property, literary property and intellectual property is not limited 
to proceeding along taxonomic lines of what qualifies as property within a given 
regime. Such analysis, while insightful for understanding the borders of consideration, 
 Taken from the album’s website. “When recorded music loses its monetary value, it’s the little guy 186
who suffers most. Artists at the top of the tree have other potential revenue streams. They can tour, 
they can license, synchronize, and diversify into fashion or film. But an independent musician 
starting out has none of those options. He needs the thousand copies of his album to be worth 
something. Recorded music is the work of art.” As Walter Benjamin noted, “Reflection shows us that 
our image of happiness is thoroughly colored by the time to which the course of our own existence 
has assigned us” (“Thesis on the Philosophy of History"; Illuminations, 254). 
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what might be understood as an epochal sigh-limit, (the horizon of logic and 
imagination based on an understanding of what technology has hitherto changed and 
what legal measures are best practices in relations to the predicted future) is only the 
grounding of an examination into excavating patterns of thought accountable for the real 
transformations within the law, which have hitherto led to the expanding borders to the 
copyright regime. If this expansion bears a striking resemblance and logic to the 
imperialistic growth of capitalism it is not mere coincidence.  
In the previous chapter I aimed to open up new understandings of the materiality of 
copyright by investigating the property logic in terms of labor and property relations. 
Given the radical increase in the number of ‘ownable' musical properties through the 
reproduction of content on multiple formats and their evolution in the digital era I want 
to draw those out those transformations and their correlations to modern neoliberal 
property relations. In so doing I do not insist on arguing that musical industries actively 
sought out the trajectory they, and we along with them, are on––although there is ample 
evidence to claim they were actively engaging in decision making practices that 
rendered it possible, if not probable. My intention is, on the one hand, to identify 
correlations within the rationale of propertization in current finance-capitalism and, on 
the other, to point out the ways in which ‘cultural properties’, and in particular music 
properties, have been more than mere victims in this process. Such a critique is not 
intended to seal the doom of music, but, rather, to take stock of how advanced the 
situation truly is––in the words of Benjamin, “to bring about the real state of 
emergency”–––in hopes of altering the consequences of the present.  In this sense, the 187
critique I have advanced seeks to make headway towards accounting for the 
contradictions that compose the field of copyright, for the seeds of the future are planted 
in the present. A second note, the success or failure of the record industries is entirely 
irrelevant to understanding the neoliberal capitalist drive as markets are erroneously 
justified as rewards for right decisions, but merely in directing where the next 
investment or expenditure ought to be made. Now I turn to exploring the 
transformations within music properties and their correlations in neoliberal market 
 Benjamin, “Thesis on the Philosophy of History” VIII, in Illuminations, 257.187
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capitalism. I want to talk about the way economics has been framed (consumption), 
relations of technology and capitalism in relation to the rapid accumulation of property 
in their multiplication and our storage capacities on devices and platforms, the way to 
laws are passed and lastly, the tendency to capitalize cultural products and monopoly 
rent. 
Accumulation, Manifest Discography & 
Platform Logic
Following the tradition of many leftist critical perspectives, placing copyright (the 
practice, institution, and behaviors related) within some larger totality allows a critique 
in which it can be seen to “play an intrinsic part in the reproduction of certain forms of 
inequality, alienation, or injustice.”  Copyright and the all too often technological 188
excuse is problematic several reasons I argued above: 1) it is a limited understanding of 
materiality of media and format; 2) it betrays any agency/responsibility on behalf of the 
aggrieved parties; 3) it has and continues to be used as an excuse to exploit and extend 
the borders of the law; and I will argue here, it obfuscates the financial realities girding 
existent practices and locations of culture. 
Copyright was established to promote the “useful Arts and Sciences” but is invoked in 
the event of their violation. It is a limited privilege guaranteed by the government for an 
explicitly democratic purpose and in the interest of the public. This broad statement is 
something US law upholds and most lawmakers and lawyers can agree upon. However, 
the means and measures of demarcating “limited”, of understanding the functioning 
intricacies of “democracy” and measuring the “interest of the public” appear in stunning 
variety. The unique situation of music, virtually predicated on this guarantee, puts the 
industrial models of music and legal framework copyright in contentious dialogue. 
Throughout history music has had the unfortunate position of responding to social, 
cultural and technological changes first. Take the CD and DVD, as law professor Randal 
 David Graeber, Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 227.188
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C. Picker notes: [u]nlike music CD’s, where encryption of content has come very late, 
DVD’s came with content controls from the get-go.”   189
The complications arrive when we realize that works that receive this protection, even 
void of authorial majesty or public celebrity, free of ideological shadows or distortions 
are still important to us, still something special. The various media of art and culture 
demand our attention because we think they can point us in a direction towards better 
understanding ourselves. All the while, these works, “existing on a higher plane of 
creativity and meaning” are steadily becoming commercialized and commodified. The 
desire to come to their defense tends to reduce our thought to a set of contradictory 
positions, a cognitive dissonance, whose untangling often seems excessively 
technical––a problem trapped in confines of legalese. 
A common result is that a certain tendency to adopt a view of musical creations similar 
to those who claim to be the creators. Whether or not that is the artist, music industry 
officials or even the government “[t]he most robust policy ideas are informed by a 
cogent rhetorical framework that eases their way to general acceptance.”  Copyright is 190
no different, particularly when the argument is framed in terms of ‘piracy’. The 
exposure effect of certain arguments tends to link the familiarity of certain arguments 
with their logic, rational or power to convince. A view of music aligned with that of the 
industry from which it, in large part, arises, raises the question of why would our 
treatment of music be any different? It is true that not all music follows this trajectory, 
but a considerable portion of it does. There are at present three major record labels, 
Sony BMG, Universal Music Group and Warner Music Group and together they 
account for anywhere between sixty-six to eighty-eight percent of the global market 
share.  Following Universal’s buyout of EMI in 2012, all three companies are based in 191
 Randal C. Picker “From Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the 189
Propertization of Copyright”, The University of Chicago Law Review (70:281) 282.
 Niel Weinstock Netanel “Copyright and Democratic Civil Society” The Yale Law Journal 106/2 (1996) 190
306.
 Nielsen SoundScan notes in 2011 that the “Big Four” controlled about 88% of the market. In 2012, 191
after the merger between EMI and Sony Music Entertainment, Nielson SoundScan reported a growth 
noting that the “Big Three” controlled 88.5% of the market.
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the United States.  While the ‘indies’ are gradually taking up more and more of the 192
market share in terms of ownership, they are themselves no so independent. In fact, 
many independents, like those accounting for most of the indie reporting, such as Taylor 
Swift’s Big Machine Records, are either owned by the majors are distributed by one.  193
Indies, then, have managed to maintain their ‘lead’ in publishing revenues but are 
unable to keep up with sales of CD or LPs. There is something to the distinction 
between distribution and ownership that I would like to draw attention to. 
The crisis of copyright coincides with the fact that the copyright regime has expanded 
over the past century. But empire has never succeeded by merely maintaining what it 
has, rather, its ravenous appetite of requires that conquest go on, if always to that place 
just out of view. This is equally true in the case of music, a mode of expression that has 
historically receded into memory and until recently consistently remained difficult to 
ascertain by sight. With the innovation of sound recording technologies, real sounds, not 
just their symbols, could be captured, stored, and experienced again. The obvious is 
worth stating here: the advent of sound recording technologies produced the necessary 
conditions for the accumulation of sound recordings. Objectification is a sufficient, but 
not a necessary, condition for commercialization, but what in the United States 
amounted to Manifest Discography, a movement that can be described as the ideological 
equivalent of the Western land grab only played out in musical formats and on the field 
of various platforms. These accumulative tendencies not only reflect a cultural and 
social understanding of property but in term they helped determine our understanding of 
property more generally.  Scholars have written about composers, music performers, 194
collectors, bootleggers, pirates, re-mixes and mash-ups and onto music’s capacity to 
 Congressional hearings in both the EU and US seemed to acknowledge the monopolization occurring 192
but ultimately failed to act. Regulators approved of the takeover insinuating a major re-organization 
in the field. See https://www.thebalance.com/big-three-record-labels-2460743
 Ed Christman, Big Machine is distributed by Universal Music Group. “U.S. Recording Industry 2015: 193
Streams Double, Adele Dominates” http://www.billboard.com/articles/business/6835216/us-
recording-industry-2015-streams-double-adele-dominates-nielsen-music. (Accessed 5.1.2016).
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“overextension” to cover a very similar meaning” (Arendt, Imperialism, vii). “Only the very rich and 
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diversify into film with Cinema until it’s own manifestation with MTV.  Music’s 195
ubiquity in modern society demonstrates the radical increase in consumable musical 
properties, but it also directs the inquiry into thinking about the means of accessing all 
of these new formats via platforms. 
That the largest record companies in the world, collectively called the “majors”, have a 
level of  influence on the distribution of music well beyond cargo shipping is hardly 
surprising in our digital culture. At each turn, copyrights for individual composers took 
profit, prestige and power from wealthy patrons, recording technologies at the 
beginning of the twentieth-century replaced the purchasing of sheet music to the dismay 
of music publishers, while between online file-sharing and the creation of the iPod and 
iTunes legal and illegal online music distribution came to be dominated by individuals 
swapping music for free or the profiteering computer company Apple and iTunes.  196
Scholars have noted that over history various musical platforms, from the stage to 
spotify, have developed their own unique control points. It is copyright, however, that 
have developed to cover an “increasing range of creative works and their uses –– 
although doing so took extensive wrangling among various interested parties with 
governing authorities.”  Indeed, online platforms like Spotify, Soundcloud and Rdio 197
have gotten their starts, or been rescued from bankruptcy, by major label investment and 
subsequent ownership. Forbes magazine notes, “Left for dead by most investors and 
pundits, the surviving Big Three labels–Warner, Universal and Sony––have quietly 
muscled out stakes of the hottest digital entertainment startups, including 10% to 20%, 
collectively, of the established streaming services, such as Spotify and Rdio.”  All this 198
stands to reason record industry players learned a lesson in the wake of failing to 
 Lee Marshall Bootlegging & Romanticism, Alex Sayf Cummings Democracy of Sound, Appetite for 195
Disaster, Noise: Political Economy of Music, etc.
 David Tilson, Carsten Sørensen, Kalle Lyytinen “Platform Complexity: Lessons from the Music 196
Industry”, System Sciences (HICSS), 2013 46th Hawaii International Conference on, 4630.
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capitalize with Apple’s “Rip, Mix, Burn” campaign.  There is no doubt that the 199
algorithms utilized by streaming services are often opaque but it has become all the 
more clear that the contracts artists have with their labels determine the actual payout, 
and generally speaking, they’re not in favor of the artist.  200
This type of behavior is nothing remarkable, or new, when seen in light of the previous 
investments made by music publishers since their professionalization. Control of 
various platforms, like the printing press, “could be used to exert influence on the 
trajectory of cultural change in music and elsewhere.”  The mass production of 201
compositions and music instruments help mold the music industry into the shape we 
now recognize it to be. Later, with the introduction of copyright, the profitable capacity 
of the mass scale production of scores granted new motivations for investment and 
capital into the industries. Later on, with the approval of the Copyright Acts of 1909 and 
1978 (the introduction of a right to mechanical reproduction, compulsory license 
systems in 1909 in response to the new recording technologies; works for hire and the 
protection of sound recordings in response to technological advances in recording, 
distribution) granted a new source of revenue for right’s holders. The law continued to 
expand, when in 1992 Congress declared copyright renewal to be automatic, in 1998 it 
went from Life plus fifty, to Life plus Seventy and later that same year President Clinton 
signed into law the contentious Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).  The 202
point of referencing these court cases to to draw attention to the particular ways in 
which copyright can be said to be expanding and the identify the radical change in 
scope. With each move, copyright law has protected a growing number of items to be 
owned, a logic endemic of manifest discography, but it has undergone a radical 
transformation in lockstep with neoliberal property logic. Once technology provided a 
 Tilson, Sørensen, Lyytinen, “Platform complexity,” 6.199
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means to shrink those properties into 1’s and 0’s, not only could more be sold, but the 
format specifics required purchasing devices to access the same music.  
Whether it was the CD or the MP3, audiences needed to invest in the machines that 
access music above and beyond the music itself. This transition led to right’s holders 
investing in a range of new items from music apparel, Beats by Dre recently purchased 
by Apple, to creating entirely new platforms for access music, such as the new 
streaming service Tidal, fronted by the likes of huge names like Jay-Z, Beyonce, Kayne 
West and Daft Punk. The fact that artists are now the face of these services should 
suggest they are somehow better, however. All of these changes point to the growing 
allure of finance. Whether it is the algorithmic services provided by streaming services 
or the prohibitive pricing of Once Upon A Time in Shaolin, questions of copyright and 
music has been cast in terms of access. This propertization amounts to a slow blurring 
of the boundaries between tangible properties and intangible properties as Picker 
argues: “in some basic way, to date, intellectual property has lacked one further key 
characteristic of tangible property: absent taking by force, use of tangible properties 
requires prior consent of the owner.”  Intellectual property isn’t monitored in this way: 203
singing in the shower does require any down payment. Rather, intellectual property 
works post-facto, where one might sue in the event of a violation. The apparent ubiquity 
of music has concealed the nature of the dominant modern relationship to music: access. 
Format theory has shed light on the fact that it is how, when and where we access music 
that demands our attention. Just as property is no longer imagined in terms of plots of 
land, we can no longer think in terms of returning to some collector’s romance in 
owning music as discrete items. There is a certain irony when Cilvaringz claims:  
“We always treasure the things we had to work for or commit to more than the things 
that are a click away. I still remember the albums I had to queue up to buy with my hard 
earned money – the process of investing in it deepened the experience of listening to it. 
And that is the other critical point here - questioning whether universal accessibility has 
diminished the way we experience music.”  204
 Picker, “From Edison to the Broadcast Flag,” 283.203
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The question of investment indeed determines our experience of listening to music in 
the streaming era, but it is foolish to think that spending money on music makes it any 
desirable when access to music is largely approached as access to music in reserve. The 
vast catalog available on streaming services was only the natural outcome of the cultural 
tendency to fill iPod's and other devices to their max. Under what rubric might we 
understood musical properties? 
Allocating Acoustics
As scholars have noted, the reasons for copyright’s extension are many and they have 
pressed themselves upon the hearts and minds of judges, legislators and policymakers 
with varying successes throughout history.  The rational framework encasing the logic 205
of access in the modern copyright regime can be said to be rooted in “a blend of 
neoclassical and institutional economic property theory.”  Acknowledging this 206
framework is useful because it resists the utopian tendency to claim cultural objects 
exist outside the dominant economic model of our time, it has explanatory power for 
understanding the experiential shift from ownership to access and provides a logic for 
understanding copyright’s expansionism. Neoclassical economics in copyright can be 
distinguished from the traditional view that sees copyright in terms of a limited and 
necessary incentive for the creation of new works. Neoclassical though pushes 
economic analysis in the other direction stressing the expansive property regime with 
maximum duration, ultimately resulting in the diminution of the public domain. Under 
the neoclassical approach, copyright is “a mechanism for market facilitation, for moving 
existing create works to the highest socially valued uses,” that is, by allowing copyright 
owners to achieve maximum profit from their works in the market.  There is at once a 207
general sense by neoclassical advocates that law is already loaded with an implicit 
 Netanel notes, “there are many reasons for copyright’s expansion, including technological 205
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economic logic, a rational that such economic thinking and language merely seek to 
bring out.  Thus, for the neoclassical thinker property’s central role in promoting 208
allocative efficiency of creative works means focusing on perfecting markets for all 
potential uses creative works may have at the expense of any balance between artist and 
audience.  
The question for the traditionalist precariously hinges on finding the “right” amount of 
protection to give the “right” amount of incentive for the “right” amount of time for 
ultimate benefit of the public. The neoclassicist can bypass these taxing policy issues by 
guaranteeing maximum protection and leaving their allocation up to the market’s 
fluctuations and mechanisms. Netanel is quick to note: “To be certain, neoclassicist 
copyright scholars are generally mindful that market dictates will sometimes conflict 
with copyright’s democracy-enhancing goals.”  Nevertheless, towards the goal of 209
settling the immense difficulty of variable pricing and piracy neoclassical models offer 
simplified equations to the irregularities of the market and demands of the public. Such 
thinking amounts to maximum rights for owners equivalent to allowing rights owners 
the privilege to collect monopoly rent, thereby guaranteeing authors to develop their 
works in the way consumers want.  The dubious logic such a model is based upon 210
requires two comments. The first is that the logic of property inherent in this system can 
be said to have its roots in marginal utility theory. Marginal utility theory sees property 
as the ability to capture future profits, and not “the embodiment of previously 
committed investment and labor.”  The fact that property is no longer based on a logic 211
of labor in the creation of new works is a late-coming nail in the coffin to the dead 
model of romantic determinism. Moreover, copyright logic has effectually ceased to 
promote the creation of anything new at all but has turned to capitalizing on the possible 
uses of what already exists. By engaging with the materiality of copyright we had 
arrived at a similar conclusion: the vast production of redundant content in various 
 Bruce A. Ackerman “Law, Economics, and the Problem of Legal Culture” Duke Law Journal, 208
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formats amounts to a condition of music as a kind of standing reserve.  The 212
homecoming of Valéry’s prophetic words, “Just as water, gas, and electricity are brought 
into houses from far far off to satisfy our needs in response to minimal effort, so we 
shall be supplied with visual or auditory images, which will appear and disappear at a 
time movement of the hand, hardly more than a sign.”  The comparison between 213
utilities and works of art may, at first, seem a bit harsh, but we should not be turned off. 
One might be inclined to suggest it is more the distribution networks, the individualism 
inherent to one’s own electric consumption that Valery references but there is, no doubt, 
an ominous notion in the massive infrastructure inferred before the possibility of such a 
totality can come into existence at all. What we might term as the institutional view, or 
anything on such a scale, is most often likened to mass production of the kind that 
privileges the movement of goods over and above their unique capacities to inspire and 
enthrall. Such a transition is no doubt corollary to the developments in economics, as 
Netanel has observed, “like neoclassical law and economics, new institutional property 
theory also tends to elevate market change over the implementation of public policy 
through law.”  This logic should recall the previous critique of property as property 214
relations over any particular good or set of goods. The result is a reversal of motive, an 
inverse ideological move where the movement of musical works across the market 
justifies the policies that guarantee their movement. The role of copyright in promoting 
the creation of new works takes an auxiliary role to ensuring the universally exclusive 
transfer of property goods. To make the second point I will turn to David Harvey’s work 
“The Art of Rent: Globalization, Monopoly and the Commodification of Culture” to 
explain the radical consequences of monopoly rents in the fields of art and culture. 
For David Harvey, scholarship is long over due for re-engaging politics at crossroads of 
culture, capital and social alternatives if there is to be any opportunity for rallying the 
old vanguards of radical discussion. The abstraction “monopoly rent” then aims to 
 Drawing from Heidegger, such an ‘enframing’ of music posits music to come into being at a whim. 212
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secure Harvey’s approach to describing the larger entrenched process many blithely 
label the commodification of culture. The tendency to write-off the term “monopoly 
rent” as too technical, or simply void of any of the emotion that alienated cultural 
producers are actually feeling is reminiscent of the tendency to avoid discussions of 
copyright for its purported legal intricacies. In both cases, there is a sentiment of the 
gigantic, understood at one and the same time as the disorienting feeling of standing on 
the ledge of some great quantitative expanse of contemporary numerical logic and the 
realization that such an expanse is hardly something numbers have produced. The sheer 
expanse works in abstraction to prohibit critical thought and as such Harvey aims to 
show where and how various cultural practices intersect with political-economic forces. 
He writes, “monopoly rent arises because social actors can realize an enhanced income 
stream over an extended time by virtue of their exclusive control over some directly or 
indirectly tradable item which is in some crucial respects unique and non-replicable.”  215
For Harvey, there are two situations in which monopoly rents tend to arise. The first is 
that some special resource, commodity or location that allows for social actors to extract 
maximum rent from those who want to use it; following Marx, Harvey proposes a 
vineyard producing excellent wine as the ideal example. The property component might 
be a prime central location within a city such that residential rents but predominately 
commercial rents would be extremely high due to accessibility. These are indirect cases 
of monopoly rent, because the commodity itself is not traded upon but rather the 
“commodity or service produced through their use” that garners an added value.  The 216
direct monopoly rent is when the vineyard or prime real estate is traded upon directly. In 
these instances capitalists invest in these spaces for future purposes, withholding the 
property from use for speculative gains. This situation is more akin to purchasing a rare 
work of art. For the purposes of the present work, it’s important to note that the two 
overlap with relative frequency (invest in an art work and lease it to a museum for an 
exhibition) but it is the distinct contradictions Harvey identifies in the system as a whole 
that I want to draw attention to. 
 David Harvey, “The Art of Rent: Globalization, Monopoly, and the Commodification of Culture” 215
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The first is that no matter how unique, special, rare or brilliant the work is it is never 
outside of the tradable realm of money. No matter what the object is, take for example, 
Once Upon A Time in Shaolin, now the most expensive album ever sold, it is not so 
special that it could not be bought and sold, over and over again. Thus, when Cilvaringz 
speaks about the uniqueness of the album he speaks about having to contractually 
sustain it, even if he resorts to another logic: 
“Initially we wanted the buyer to do whatever he wanted with it. But when we realised 
how much commercial interest there was, we began to understand that allowing it to 
play out in that way would undermine its trajectory as an art piece, even if no amount of 
replication could touch the original. We felt that retail commercialization and mass 
replication would dilute the status of the album as a one off work of art and compromise 
the integrity of our statement.” 
 The “status of the album as a one off work of art” is tied to its status as an so-called 
investment. Quickly reselling the album or allowing the owner to rent it out to a series 
of museums and galleries (the original plan for the album) would immediately cut into 
the monopoly status of a single work accessible by only one person: “Only one man can 
hold the scepter,” after all. 
The tendency towards monopoly is not a recent phenomenon in the history of 
capitalism, nor in the music industries. The majors were not always controlling over 
eighty percent of music. People used to listen to local music, but once local labels and 
radio stations had to compete with ones far away those ‘natural monopolies’ gave way 
to mega-corporations.  All along the way private property has grounded the capitalist 217
enterprise and sought out monopolies or built alliances. The second result from the 
destruction of natural monopolies in the age of globalism has been “to secure ever more 
firmly the monopoly rights of private property through international commercial laws 
that regulate all global trade,”  the result of which has been to bully countries into 218
adopting strict copyright, patent and trademark laws before they can trade with Western 
countries. The result is often alienation from cultural producers, resentment from 
 Harvey notes, “The music industry of the United States succeeds brilliantly in appropriating the 217
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foreign countries and indigenous peoples. In the case of music presently, the correlation 
between strengthening and enumeration more rights for holders and the increasing 
monopolization of the majors cannot be seen as anything other than two sides of the 
same coin. A coin capitalism seeks to acquire to no end; and to this end, Harvey aims to 
direct the progressive forces of culture. An understanding of the neoliberal capitalist 
framework gives credence to the development of copyright towards a speculative 
practice. The consequences of this turn are nothing short of an abandonment of the 
democratic values inherent in the creation of copyright in the United States and the all 
out rejection of art and culture’s unique position as the grounds for creative autonomy 
and expression. As Netanel notes, “the ‘patronage’ of advertisers and bundled service 
providers would be no less constraining than that of  contemporary corporate givers and 
seventieth-century aristocrats.”  And white I would be remiss to acknowledge that our 219
view of democratic governance has changed as well, I would like to draw attention to 
the concern of scope. Charting the path of copyright expansion in parallel with 
neoliberal financial capital demonstrates the radical inverse of values market driven 
logic requires. 
All of these factors should indicate that cultural industries, music among them, are not 
beyond or outside the influence of neoliberal capitalist policies. It is not that these 
industries were overtaken or betrayed by a series of bad deals forcing their hand. What 
happened with the massive restructuring of industry in the 1970’s and into the 1980’s 
happened across the board–– the cultural industries included. Changes in the copyright 
law not merely changing at the whims of music industry officials, but with the corporate 
conglomerates being formed in the steady dissolution of singular companies. This can 
be seen with the changing economic structures of the music industries towards 
maximizing profit extraction in response to the expanding rights secured by the 
Copyright Act of 1976, even if it meant it came at the expense of their own company 
suffered. Years after Sony Entertainment’s buyout of CBS has secured Sony Records as 
a major they became embroiled in protecting their properties as the rip, copy burn crazy 
of the 1990’s and 00’s hit home. Much of the music being ‘ripped’ off of CD’s was 
performed by Sony devices signaling the tendency of corporations to take the money 
 Netanel, “Copyright and Democracy,” 361-362.219
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out of one hand and putting it in the other. This larger transformation matches on with 
the broader history of finance capitalism. As David Graeber has noted:  
“One of the great innovations of recent decades is the enormous efflorescence of 
finance capital: at this point, over 90% of economic transactions in what is called the 
global marketplace no longer have any immediate connection with manufacturing or 
trading commodities of any kind, but simply consist of currency trading and other forms 
of financial speculation.”  220
This type of investment is not only mirrored, but anchored in the global administrative 
system copyrights have become. Seen in light of the growth of finance capital the crisis 
of copyright appears to mimic the tendency of bureaucratic regimes to rely on 
government authority to extract their profits.  The result of which has been the steady 221
increase in class power.  A type of class power infamous in the United States at the 1% 222
and mimicked in the music industries. In 2014, a study showing the digital and physical 
music sales showed an estimated seventy-seven percent of music income goes to the 
superstar artists.  The Atlantic reports, “even though the amount of digital music sold 223
has surged, the 10 best-selling tracks command 82 percent more of the market than they 
did a decade ago. The advent of do-it-yourself artists in the digital age may have grown 
music’s long tail, but its fat head keeps getting fatter.”  This is not merely the 224
dedication of a growing fanbase for singular stars, but the result of a big data-driven 
analysis that allows record labels to predict which songs will be hits and to guarantee 
their profitability by analyzing the ways in which people are engaging music, how they 
are experiencing it, and where. If we take Graeber’s history at his word then the general 
transition in the music industry starts to mimic that of what was happening in the 
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country as a whole. The “strategic pivot of the upper echelons of U.S. corporate 
bureaucracy” towards shareholders and then towers the financial structure as a whole 
produced the financial equity firms and mega-corporations that we find incredibly 
obvious today. “Think about it from the view of investments” we’re told. The 
persistence of noting the failure of many albums to recoup the investments record labels 
have made begins starts to sound as though investment does not inherently include any 
risk, have the music industries gotten “too big to fail”? 
Throughout this chapter I have attempted to locate and draw out the correlations 
between the propertization of copyright in musical properties and larger neoliberal 
economic processes. These connections serve the purpose of identifying the extractive 
and alienating tendencies within copyright practices surrounding music within the larger 
totality of the economy. A framing procedure that I hope to have demonstrated has great 
purchase on stretching the understanding of the extant crisis of copyright beyond the 
purely economic. Copyright has never caused anyone to purchase music and certainly 
not to purchase more music. Rather, just as the copyright regime has proliferated into a 
stunning array of content and the devices to access this content, it has developed 
according to a logic that believes they are guaranteed a return on investments already 
made, a business model radically similar to financial investment bankers. Just as what 
constitutes a musical property has transformed, so have the number of ways to access it 
and controlling those access points. The model of the gate keeper may be gone, but the 
gates remain. Capital  will continue to seek to secure profit from that access. 
Interestingly enough, this model might be likened to live music, where the quality of the 
show is entirely independent of the cost of entry. In this experiential and expectational 
contradiction a conversation of copyright must arise. As neoclassical economics has 
little to offer to the way in which we actually communicate and experience and 
everything to over in what we can expect copyright must aspire to encourage 
communication to give voice to the causes of contemporary experience of alienation 
from our own culture. 
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Conclusion: Charting the 
Future
There can be no mistake that studies of copyright are grim. The dialectics leading 
towards “irresolution,” the legal trajectory “futile and necessary.”  They have a 225
negative prophetic ring like the words Benjamin issued on the eve of the fascist era: “It 
is only for the sake of those without hope that hope is given to us,” more than any 
prophetic remark about revolutionary potential. It is no confidence builder when the 
influence of well-heeled private interest has such powerful sway over legislature in 
comparison to the diverse expectations and desires of the public at large. That their 
interests are not necessarily the public’s is to admit the obvious only though. The 
situation is advanced, but, as I have argued, it is precisely because of this dissension that 
the crisis has emerged into public consciousness. 
Copyright, it has been argued, is notorious for “industry rent-seeking,” and while recent 
years only point to every increasing levels of unprecedented influence by private 
interests and corporations in both level and kind of protection, it also has seen their 
involvement in the writing of law. Even such incrimination cannot succeed without a 
compelling rhetorical and theoretical armature to appease some and win general 
acceptance amongst the others. To this end, I have sought to lay the groundwork for 
building a new lexicon to outfit frameworks for understanding the crisis of copyright, to 
critically engage the history of copyright and finally, to begin imagining alternatives. In 
this thesis I have aimed to demonstrate the reach of a particular rhetorical and 
theoretical framework of copyright (property), how it is employed, and what 
consequences such a framework may lead to. This speculative approach aimed to lay the 
groundwork for identifying the logic of expansion within the copyright regime. 
Cartographically speaking, the work aimed to both provide an alternative image of 
copyright by charting its extensions along rhetorical, material and economic 
dimensions. Beyond just prividing an alternative by which to imagine copyright, this 
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work aimed to dig up and decipher the subterranean logic by which we can understand 
the present moment. To this end, future research should look to a history of the 
metaphorics of property and their implications for understanding our experience of art 
and the problematics of digitalization. Furthermore, investigations in the pragmatic 
effects of the metaphor will direct thought towards format, media and the materiality of 
copyright and the works it aims to encourage and protect. 
Propertization, put simply, amounts to the idea that conceptions of copyright are 
composed from the possibilities provided within the metaphorics of property––that 
these metaphorics change as our engagement with the world and the orientation 
provided by property relations transform, is a historical fact.  Given that property 226
serves as a founding metaphor for how we orient, think and act in the world, the world 
of copyright has had little trouble in accommodating to these changing notions of 
property. Thus, propertization helps give shape to the transformations of copyright with 
a high level of correspondence to our experiences of these transformations throughout 
history. In so doing, it also posits an alternative view of the crisis of copyright. For this 
reason, I sought to identify those factors within the propertization of copyright that best 
demonstrate what I argue accounts for the unique course it has taken. A course that was 
by no means preordained or linear, but, rather, took the form the limitations and 
barriers––historical, economic, political, technological and cultural–– imposed in 
various situations. In this sense, that copyright was ‘understood’ as property in its 
origins, just as it is now, would be an invalid inference; while copyright owners did not 
hesitate to use “property rhetoric” in earlier skirmishes property supplied a different 
framework for thinking and operating in the world. This was best evidenced by function 
reoccupation of positions by copyright throughout history. Similarity may insure 
identity, but it does not guarantee function.  
Additionally, I argued that alternative models of thinking about copyright, the author 
paradigm and the constitutional paradigm have not resulted in limiting changes to the 
 Hughes writes, “The concern over the influence of the property construct takes several distinct forms, 226
the three most prominent being concern about natural rights views of property, concern about real 
property views of property, and concern about law and economics theory,” (997).
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expanding copyright regime, nor do they provide convincing accounts of the changes 
copyright has hitherto undergone. Furthermore, the process of amending copyright, or 
accounting for any uncertain areas has been, to a large extent, left up to the courts to 
decide. And for more of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries their rulings have be 
overwhelmingly in favor of copyright expansion.  The “reoccupation” of the author by 227
property within the background metaphorics of copyright did not occur within the hearts 
and minds of unsuspecting individuals though. The transformation in thinking about 
music that occurred with the advent of recorded sound had tremendous repercussion for 
our understanding and experience of music and the industries that consolidated around 
it. Not only did it supply the necessary conditions for the possibility of owning a 
recording of sound, effectively revolutionizing human habits in sense perception and 
communication, it brought with it commercialization, customization, and culturization. 
Indeed, propertization has a special purchase in considerations of music. In the 
particular sense of music, propertization identifies an essential quality of musical 
properties, inalienable from its format, that structures experience. Each musical property 
is considered to have a horizon of experience, designed towards the ways someone 
might experience it. This logic is increasingly understood as imagined points of access 
or possible uses. It is plausible at any point that music be left abstract, unsullied by 
material expression and thus propertized, but as such it is equally unsullied by the ears 
of an audience and left to have the sound equivalent to that magical fall of a tree in a 
forest, experienced perhaps in theory but never in earnest. What this property entails 
however, is a propensity to form connections, to bring people into relation. This is what 
Benjamin referred to as “the idea of life and afterlife in works of art.” The reproduction 
of sound was a revolutionary moment, it became resoundingly clear: “there was an 
inkling that life was not limited to organic corporeality.”  Sampling, remixing and 228
covers continue to breath new relevance into the afterlives of art. 
 Jesica Litman, “Copyright Legislation and Technological Change”. The result of which is to 227
essentially say that congress has every right to pass whatever laws they so desire.
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The metaphor of property has itself helped to provide a language to explain many of 
these transformations. As Nentanel has observed, “the naked pursuit of self-interest only 
goes so far in shaping a legal regime. The most robust policy ideas are informed by a 
given rhetorical framework that resonates among lawmakers and eases the way to 
general acceptance.”  To understand the propertization of copyright we need to 229
understand changes in property, changes in those things which can be said to be owned 
and their effects on copyright, its crisis, and our understanding of it. I argued that these 
transitions can be seen in semantic translations, informed views of the materiality of 
copyright and an understanding of speculative economics. I have argued that Once 
Upon A Time in Shaolin embodies this exaggerated and contradictory form of property 
logic. The album reflects a tendency within copyright to use property-talk to tie 
disparate meanings together and anchor otherwise free-floating arguments in favor of 
copyright expansion. The album not only exemplified the effects and consequences of 
the rhetorics of property, but by its musical nature and one-of-a-kind status implicated 
the under theorized materiality of property logic in copyright discussions. Lastly, the 
album foreshadows the results if the logic of neoclassical market theories were taken to 
its logical conclusion. In short, the album represents, complicates and implicates many 
of the forms of control copyright’s trajectory is set on. These examples help to identify 
limits and demarcations set by the paradigm of propertization. A paradigm, I have 
argued, we would do well to acknowledge but not buy into.  
Only, someone already has. Someone did pay two million dollars for the album. There is 
a certain irony to the story, not even the Wu-Tang Clan could have predicted. 
Immediately after they announced just who the “single American collector” was who 
purchased the album, the Wu-Tang Clan responded on Twitter by saying they donated a 
considerable portion of the check to charity. The purchase, which had been made in 
Spring and announced only in the Fall, proved to be a boon for news coverage but an 
ironic undoing to the project itself. The owner to be was none other than, Martin 
Shkreli, infamously known also as “Pharma Bro.” In the time between purchasing the 
album and the announcement Mr. Shkreli had managed to make himself, according to 
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The New Yorker, the “most reviled person in America.” The young pharmaceutical 
executive turned villain became infamous in the wake of a purchase of a drug called 
Daraprim his company, Turing Pharmaceuticals, had made. The drug is used to treat a 
rare illness, toxoplasmosis, a disease fatal to H.I.V. patients.  After purchasing the 230
generic drug his company raised the price from under twenty-five dollars a pill to seven 
hundred and fifty dollars, more than a 5,000% increase. Once the public got wind of the 
fact that Shkreli was going to be the single owner of the Wu-Tang Clan’s final album, 
the “seal on a dynasty,” there was a backlash. 
The truly stunning thing about the event is that Shkreli’s business move is not at all 
uncommon. Even Shkreli sharply countered that the government likes to “beat up on 
guys that are seen to be public enemies, if you will,” and noted the price hike was due to 
the “distribution model.”  The relations to the music industry are uncanny. Infact, the 231
pharmaceutical industry is the paradigmatic example of an industry wide move to 
establish monopoly powers by centralizing capital and securing unprecedented 
protection. What made him the anathema of a country for a couple weeks was not his 
actions, but the tendency to imagine that he represented the single thing keeping the 
system from working. The correlations to the concerns of copyright could not be any 
more clear. It seems that Shkreli, intent on proving a point about the influence of money 
complicates our expectations and aspirations for musicians and the music industries as 
well. The story behind Once Upon A Time In Shaolin grounds us in the contemporary 
situation by disclosing many problems we would do well to fix in the future while 
providing us with a warning from the past. The future of copyright will be decided, it’s 
territories changed, and it will be up to us to recognize what is continually changing by 
maintaining access to the common conventions of copyright which have lasted through 
time. Only then will we imagine alternatives whereby it is a future might be more 
democratic and free.  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PRESS RELEASE  
 
Paddle8 presents the exclusive sale of Wu-Tang Clan’s one-of-a-kind album  
Once Upon A Time in Shaolin 
 
Beginning March 2, the sole copy of the new and final album by the Wu-Tang Clan will be available for 
private sale through Paddle8 
 
MoMA PS1 to host an intimate listening event and conversation with RZA on Monday, March 2 
 
Paddle8 is honored to present the exclusive sale of the sole copy of the Wu-Tang Clan’s final album, 
Once Upon A Time in Shaolin. The album is a unique work of art that will be available for sale to one 
single collector, with no physical or digital duplicate in existence. Stored in a vault in Morocco since 
its completion last year, Once Upon A Time in Shaolin is the last album to include contributions by the 
entire surviving Wu-Tang Clan, and represents the apotheosis of the group’s three-decade career. 
Once Upon A Time in Shaolin will be available for private sale through Paddle8 beginning March 2, 
when Paddle8 will launch a special site with musical outtakes from the album, a track list, and 
exclusive interviews with Wu-Tang Clan founding member RZA at paddle8.com/wu-tang. 
 
With a cinematic narrative in the inimitable Wu-Tang vernacular, Once Upon A Time In Shaolin has 
been envisioned from execution through distribution as both a work of art and an audio artifact. A 
sonic sculpture presented in a hand-carved nickel-silver box, it is accompanied by a 174-page 
manuscript containing lyrics, credits, and anecdotes on the production of each song, printed on 
gilded Fedrigoni Marina parchment and encased in leather by a master bookbinder. The conditions of 
sale stipulate that the buyer will agree to not release any of the content of the artwork to the public for 
a period of 88 years. As The Independent wrote upon the announcement of the album’s intended 
distribution, it serves as  “a challenge to the increasing disposability of music in the digital era.” 
 
Once Upon A Time In Shaolin is a retrospective soundscape that threads 31 songs, skits, and stories 
into a 128-minute-long aural screenplay. Recorded in part in the Wu-Tang Clan's home enclave of 
Staten Island, New York, the album marks not only a geographic return to “Shaolin”—the 
philosophical home of the Wu-Tang Clan—but a sonic homecoming as well. In addition to the original 
Clan members, the work reunites the diaspora of MCs related to the Clan into a compelling narrative, 
featuring appearances from longtime Wu-Tang collaborators like Redman, members of an extended 
brethren including Killarmy and Sunz of Man, and the familiar scene-setting of long-time backing 
vocalists Tekitha and Blue Raspberry. Once Upon A Time in Shaolin is produced by RZA and Tarik 
“Cilvaringz” Azzougarh, who has collaborated with Wu-Tang Clan since being discovered by Ol’ 
Dirty Bastard and Method Man in 1997. 
 
On Monday, March 2, MoMA PS1 will present an intimate listening event as part of the institution’s 
Sunday Sessions series of public programming, organized by associate curator Jenny Schlenzka. The 
evening will feature a never-before-heard, 13-minute compilation of tracks from Once Upon A Time 
in Shaolin, as well as a conversation between RZA and Sasha Frere-Jones, the executive editor of 
Genius, about the album itself and its experimental distribution model. The event will serve as the 
first and only time that the public will hear excerpts from this album. A tailored sound experience has 
been generously provided by Jim Toth of Timbre Tech. 
 
“Once Upon A Time in Shaolin aims to reverse the devaluation of music, to celebrate the album as a 
work of art that encompasses the creative energies of an ecosystem of artists, and to help return music 
to a fine-art status. We are overwhelmed by the enthusiasm and curiosity for this project, and 
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